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I. INTRODUCTION

As part of the sabbatical reaccreditation of the West Virginia University College of Law in 1993, the College mailed an extensive questionnaire to its graduates.' A principle objective of the questionnaire
I. Survey of 1,077 alumni of the West Virginia University College of Law (Sept. I,
1993) (on file with author).
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was to gain information about the practice of graduates which would
assist in curriculum decisions. From the survey, the College learned
that 31% of the respondents were engaged in solo, private practice and
57% practiced in private firms of 10 lawyers or less. Of the respondents, 51% reported they were engaged in some type of real estate
practice, while 12.8% reported that they specialized in the real estate
area.2 The number of attorneys reporting some real estate practice was
second only to the number engaged in some form of corporate practice
(52%) and was one of only four categories with a response of 50% or
higher.' The 12.8% who reported that they specialized in real estate
was fourth behind plaintiffs personal injury (16.9%), defendant's personal injury (15.3%), and insurance (13.9%).' Since 76% of the survey
responses came from lawyers practicing in West Virginia, these results,
with respect to real estate practice, confirm that in West Virginia, as
opposed to those states in which title insurance companies have preempted the residential title market, title work remains a very important
area of substantive law.
In essence, title work involves looking through the appropriate
records in search of the unexpected in hopes that you will not find it.
The search of the records can be time consuming, complicated by
numerous factors and variables which the attorney cannot foresee or
control. Therefore, when an attorney begins a title examination, she or
he can only guess as to how long it will take to complete the task,
and since most residential home buyers "need" to know how much the
title work will cost, lawyers frequently perform title examinations for
an agreed sum as opposed to an hourly rate. Therefore, title work
further complicates one of the daily tasks facing a lawyer - balancing
the available number of hours between his or her clients' needs. Abraham Lincoln's often quoted remark that a "Lawyer's time is his stock
in trade" is well illustrated through title work. A "complete" title examination includes "running" the title back to the patent, the original
grant from the "state." Because of the time considerations, as well as

2. Id
3. Id (reporting as follows: plaintiff personal injury 50%; commercial 50%; real
estate 51%; corporate 52%).
4. Id.
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other considerations, it is essentially unheard of for lawyers checking
title to residential property to "run the title back to the patent." In
most residential purchases, the policies of the lending institution and
the title insurance company establish how far "back" the title must be
run. Therefore, checking title for a period of time which is less than
from patent to present is a widespread practice based upon a variety of
practical considerations which balance the cost of the title examination
against the risk ithat something may have occurred before the "cut off"
date of the title examination, which will, as a practical matter, significantly adversely affect the possessory enjoyment of the "owner" or the
lender's security interest. However, since neither the courts nor the
legislature have 'authorized" the title examiner to stop the title examination short of the patent, a "defect" in the title created prior to the
period of time covered by the title search still affects the current ownership interest even though neither the current owner nor his or her
attorney had actual knowledge of the "defect". For example, assume
the title examination covered a period of sixty years, and that eightyfive years ago a previous owner, by a properly recorded deed, conveyed all the oil and gas under the property. The severance of the oil
and gas from the surface is valid and the present "owner" does not
own the oil and gas even though the attorney did not discover the
severance deed in the title examination. The legal explanation is that
"the law" treats the current owner as having "constructive notice" of
the severance because the severance deed is in the chain of title. Constructive notice is imputed even though neither the current owner nor
his or her attorney ever had "actual knowledge" of the severance. This
example illustrates that the perimeters of a title examination are established by what "knowledge" the law imputes to the purchaser of real
property. Therefore, the title attorney's task is to search the records to
discover all information that "the law" deems the purchaser to possess
and to also make certain that the client understands and appreciates
that the law charges the purchaser with certain information or knowledge which is not found in "the records" in the courthouse. For instance, what is learned by a "view" of the land. Therefore, this Article
focuses on the substantive law which affects the "scope" or perimeters
of a title examination. The purpose of a title examination is to discover
and review those documents to which the substantial body of real
property law may be relevant.
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II. THE RECORDING AcTS
A.

In the Beginning

As "modem" property law began to take shape in feudal England,
there were no recording laws. The lack of recording laws, however,
did not preclude disputes between conflicting claims to land. To resolve these conflicts, a set of principles developed based on the concept of "first in time, first in right."5
As the quote in the footnote taken from the American Law of
Property reflects, and the discussion in the following section of the
American Law of Property, section 17.2, illustrates, the "first in time,
first in right" concept is an over-simplification of the common law
rule, but for present purposes it is sufficient. Therefore, in discussing
title examinations the distinction between "recordable interests" and
"nonrecordable interests" is of fundamental importance. If a "recordable
interest" is involved, the recording statutes are applicable, and in the
event a recordable interest is not recorded, a subsequent bona fide
5. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.1, at 523-25 (1952) (Stating:

[I]n the period prior to the enactment of recording statutes, rules originated for the
determination of priorities. For lack of recording acts in other than York and
Middlesex Counties, these remain in force in the balance of England as to all
lands to which title has not been registered under the Torrens System. They are in
force in the United States except as they have been suspended or modified by
statute. Conflicting claims not covered by statute fall into three classifications, all
covered by the general law rule that the first in time is first in right, re-enforced
.by the equity maxim that equity follows the law. The three situations to which the
rule is applied are (a) conflicts between legal interests, (b) conflicts between equitable interests, and (c) conflicts between a legal interest and an equitable interest.
It is followed literally as to item a; also, except as hereinafter noted [i.e. in section 17.2] as to item b, and there appears no reason why this should not be the
case. As to item c, the rules prevails when the earlier right is legal and the second
equitable. But when the earlier right is equitable, the courts allow it priority in the
event only that the holder of the later legal interest acquired it with notice, or did
not pay value for it if the holder of the later legal claim is a purchaser for value
without notice of the earlier equitable right or interest, the equitable doctrine of
bona fide purchaser prevails and it is the later claim which is protected. The exception has given rise to the common statement that as between two conflicting
claims, one equitable and one legal, the legal claim will prevail, though the exceptions noted show that this is not strictly correct.).
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purchaser for value may take free of that interest. For example, in a
notice jurisdiction, if 0 leases the oil and gas under Blackacre to A
who does not record, and then subsequent to the oil and gas lease, 0
conveys Blackacre to B, a bona fide purchaser for value, B, will take
"free" of the oil and gas lease. However, if the earlier interest is a
"nonrecordable interest," then reliance on the records in the "record
room" affords no protection and the purchaser takes subject to the
nonrecordable interest even though the purchaser had no actual or
constructive knowledge and was not even placed on inquiry notice.
"Short term" leases are common examples of nonrecordable interests in
real property.6
It is, therefore, important to keep in mind that if the right involved is a nonrecordable right, the recording acts do not apply, and
the general common law principle of "first in time, first in right" is
used to determine priority between the competing interests; conversely,
if recordable rights are involved, the analysis of the respective property
interests will be resolved within the framework of the recording acts
and the courts' interpretation of those statutes.
It should also be noted that neither the statute of frauds nor the
recording acts apply to rights which are "created" by the operation of
law such as adverse possession;7 perspective easements;' ways of necessity,9 and implied easements.1"
B.

Classifying the Early Recording Acts

Scholars who have studied the evolution of the modem recording
acts in our country have traced their origins to an April, 1634, ordinance enacted in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Six years later, on

6. See W. VA. CODE § 40-1-8 (Supp. 1995) (stating that: a lease concerning a recordable interest is one "for a term of more . . . than five years," or one "of any duration
under which the whole or any part of the corpus of the estate may be taken, destroyed, or
consumed, except for domestic use.").
7. See generally Core v. Faupel, 24 W. Va. 238 (1884); Sornon v. Murphy Fabrication & Erection Co., 232 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va. 1977).
8. See Town of Paden City v. Felton, 66 S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 1951).
9. See Berkeley Dev. Corp. v. Hutzler, 229 S.E.2d 732 (W. Va. 1976).
10. See Miller v. Skaggs, 91 S.E. 536 (W. Va. 1917).
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October 7, 1640, the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony
passed a law which is very similar to the present law in Massachusetts." The Massachusetts Bay Colony Act of 1640 declared that no
conveyance should be of force against any other person except the
grantor and his or her heirs unless recorded. 2 Other colonies followed
this approach and by the time of the American Revolution, the Massachusetts approach, that a conveyance was good against the grantor and
his or her heirs upon delivery and was good as to all others after being recorded, was the most prevalent form of "recording act" in the
colonies. 3 Under the literal reading of these early acts, the date of recording was the sole test of priority. Therefore, as between successive
grantees of the same land from a common grantor, the matter was
determined solely by a race to the registry. Chronologically these were
the "first type" of recording acts, and today they are classified as the
"race type."' 4
The second type of recording acts evolved from the first, initially
by judicial decision. In spite of the literal reading of the "race" statute,
courts were reluctant to give priority to a subsequent purchaser, who
although having recorded first, had knowledge of the earlier unrecorded
conveyance. Typically, legislatures amended the "race" statute to exclude from the protection of the recording acts the "exception" the
court had recognized, and to "exclude from the race to registry a subsequent purchaser who ha[d] notice of the prior conveyance."' 5 These
statutes are now classified as "notice types." 6 Since recording first is
not necessary to prevail against the "earlier" unrecorded interest in a
notice jurisdiction, the incentive to the subsequent bona fide purchaser
to record promptly is to protect the title she or he acquired from "another" subsequent purchaser. 7
11. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPEPTY § 17.4, at 528 (1952).
12. Id.
13. IaHat 535.
14. Id. at 539.
15. Id. at 540.
16. Id. In a "notice" jurisdiction, if 0 conveys Blackacre to A and then later conveys
Blackacre to B, a BFP for value, B prevails over A, if B had no "notice" of the earlier
conveyance when B acquired title and purchased for value. In a "pure notice" jurisdiction B
wins, even if A records before B.
17. Id. at 540.
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The third basic group of acts are ones, which, by their express
terms, protect the subsequent purchaser who is without notice and who
records first. These acts are described as "race notice."' 8
C. The West Virginia Statutes
The cornerstones of "modern" conveyancing are the statutes of
frauds and the recording acts. The statute of frauds defines which
transactions must be in writing to be enforceable between the parties
thereto and the degree of "formality" required of the writing. The
recording acts identify those instruments which must be recorded in
order to be valid against certain "types" of persons or entities. In West
Virginia, the provisions of the statutes of frauds pertaining to real
estate are set forth in Article 1, Chapter 36 of the West Virginia
Code. 9 Section 36-1-3 provides:
No contract for the sale of land, or the lease thereof for more than

one year, shall be enforceable unless the contract or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing and signed by the party to be charged thereby, or by his agent. But the consideration need not be set forth or expressed in the writing, and it may be proved by other evidence."0

While a discussion of the ramifications of the statute of frauds on title
examinations is beyond the scope of this article, it is noted in passing
that the judicially developed exception to the statute of frauds known
as the doctrine of part performance has become a part of title examination jurisprudence. The doctrine of part performance assumes the existence of a definite and certain agreement between the parties. What is
lacking is the written manifestation of that agreement." Once the

18. Id. In a "race notice" jurisdiction, if 0 conveys Blackacre to A and then later
conveys Blackacre to B, B will prevail if B is without 'notice' of the 0 to A conveyance,
gives value, and B records before A.
19. The original statute of frauds was enacted in England in 1677. In West Virginia,
the portions of the original statute of frauds involving real estate were included in the sections of the Code dealing with estates in property, while the provisions concerning wills are
found in Article 1, Chapter 41 of the West Virginia Code. Other provisions of the original
statute of frauds are found in Section 55-1-1. W. VA. CODE § 55-1-1 (1994).
20. W. VA. CODE § 36-1-3 (1985).
21. "To justify the relief of specific performance of a parol agreement relating to real
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"contract" has been established, there must be partial performance of
the contract. Traditionally, part performance has involved the vendee
taking possession and paying all or part of the purchase price or possession plus making valuable improvements.22
Whereas West Virginia Code Section 36-1-3 requires that certain
types of transactions be in writing and signed by the party to be
charged to be enforceable, Section 36-1-1 requires the formalities of a
deed or will for the creation of certain interests. Section 36-1-1 provides:
No estate of inheritance or freehold, or for a term of more than five
years, in lands, or any other interest or term therein of any duration under
which the whole or any part of the corpus of the estate may be taken,
destroyed, or consumed, except for domestic use, shall be created or conveyed unless by deed or will.23

While the term "deed" has a recognized legal connotation as it
pertains to real property, the word "deed", as used in this Section of
the Code, has received little judicial attention. In Arbaugh v. Raines,24
the court discussed an agreement involving an oil and gas lease and
posed the question of whether any interest in the leasehold estate was
transferred. After quoting Section 36-1-1, the court said "Suffice [it] to

estate, three things, as the books say, must concur: First, the agreement relied on must be
certain and definite in its terms; second, the acts proved in part performance must refer to,
result from, or be made in pursuance of the agreement proved; third, the agreement must
have been so far executed that a refusal of full execution would operate as a fraud upon
the party, and place him in a situation which does not lie in compensation." Wegmann v.
Clark, 118 S.E. 517, 521 (W. Va. 1923) (citations omitted).
22. "Certain acts of part performance of verbal agreements for the sale of real estate
have always been recognized in equity as taking a case out of the strict application of the
statute of frauds. Code, 36-1-3. For example, payments of purchase money, in whole or in
part, accompanied by possession of the land sold; or possession thereof, coupled with the
placing of valuable improvements thereon by the purchaser, have always been held to justify
a decree for the specific performance of a verbal agreement to convey real estate. Other instances could be mentioned. Courts proceed on the general theory that, in such circumstances, to permit a vendor to evade his agreement would, in a sense, be to permit the practice
of fraud by him against the vendee, and equity has always avoided such result." Callaham
v. First Nat'l Bank of Hinton, 30 S.E.2d 735, 738 (W. Va. 1944).
23. W. VA. CODE § 36-1-1 (1985).
24. 184 S.E.2d 620 (W. Va. 1971).
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say that the agreement referred to above is neither a deed nor [a] will.
No words of transfer or conveyance are contained therein. It could not,
therefore, convey an interest in the lessee's estate."25 In the Arbaugh
case, Raines had leased the oil and gas under a tract of land, and sold
1/32 shares in the well for $250 each.26 In explaining the agreement,
the court said:
The agreement between these parties reflects a practice common in
the area of oil and gas development. A lessee obtains a lease which he retains as his own property. In order to get funds with which to produce oil
or gas, he sells shares in a proposed well to be drilled on his leasehold
estate. The money from the sale of such shares is pooled to pay for the
costs of drilling the well, and, if the venture is successful, the shareholders
divide the profits from the production of that well. That they are entitled
to nothing more, so far as the leasehold estate is concerned, is demonstrated by the fact that if the lessee drilled another well on such leased
land, in which they had no financial interest, they would receive no part

of the profits from such well. In the instant case C.D. Raines merely sold
shares in the well. He did not sell an interest in his leasehold estate and,
if another well produced oil or gas thereon, these plaintiffs would not be
entitled to share in the profits therefrom."
In addition to the discussion in the Arbaugh case that a deed requires words of transfer, further guidance as to the definition of a
"deed" is found in Article 3, Chapter 36 of the Code. Section 36-3-1
provides that a "seal, or any symbol or word intended to have the
effect of a seal, shall not be necessary to give validity to any deed",28
while Section 36-3-3 provides that affixing a seal to any instrument
conveying an interest in land, "shall not give to such instrument any
additional force or effect . . . than such instrument would have if it
were unsealed." ' 9 Perhaps most significantly, Section 36-3-4, which
abolishes the distinction between various types of common law conveyances, reads in part: "Any instrument which shows on its face a present intent to pass the title to, or any interest, present or future, in real
property, shall, if properly executed and delivered, be given effect
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 623.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 624.
NV. VA. CODE
W. VA. CODE

§ 36-3-1 (1985).
§ 36-3-3 (1985).
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according to its manifest intent."3 Furthermore, Section 36-3-6 provides that consideration does not need to be set forth in order to have
a valid deed.3"
Therefore, assuming a writing which satisfies the requirements of
Sections 36-1-1 and 36-1-3, the next question is which written instruments must be recorded in order to afford the parties to those instruments protection under the recording acts. Keep in mind, the transfer
of an interest is binding between the parties when the "deed" is "delivered" - the recording is to protect the title to the acquired interest
from those who are subsequent in time and protected under the recording acts.
In resolving conflicts between competing interests in real property,
the threshold question is whether the recording acts apply. If the recording acts do not apply, then the respective rights are resolved by
the common law principle of "first in time, first in right."
D. The West Virginia Recording Acts: The Aegis Afforded BFP'sfor
Value
In West Virginia, the recording acts applicable to real property are
found in West Virginia Code Sections 40-1-8 and -9. Section 40-1-8
applies to contracts involving the sale or lease of certain interests in
real estate. Section 40-1-8 provides:
Any contract in writing made in respect to real estate or goods and
chattels in consideration of marriage; or any contract in writing made for
the conveyance or sale of real estate, or an interest or term therein of

30. W. VA. CODE § 36-3-4 (1985). The full text of this statute provides:
All distinctions in legal effect between deeds of grant, deeds of bargain and sale,
deeds of lease and release, and deeds of covenant to stand seized, are hereby abolished. Any instrument which shows on its face a present intent to pass the title to,
or any interest, present or future, in real property, shall, if properly executed and
delivered, be given effect according to its manifest intent. No instrument purporting
to convey land, or any interest therein, shall fail of effect merely for lack of conformity with the language of sections five, six, seven, eight or nine [(§§ 36-3-5,
36-3-6, 36-3-7, 36-3-8 or 36-3-9)] of this article.
Id.
31. W. VA. CODE § 36-3-6 (1985).
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more than five years, or any other interest or term therein, of any duration, under which the whole or any part of the corpus of the estate may
be taken, destroyed, or consumed, except for domestic use, shall, from the
time it is duly admitted to record, be, as against creditors and purchasers,
as valid as if the contract were a deed conveying the estate or interest
embraced in the contract. In lieu of the recording of a lease pursuant to
this section, there may be recorded with like effect a memorandum of
such lease, executed by all persons who are parties to the lease and acknowledged in the manner to entitle a conveyance to be recorded. A
memorandum of lease thus entitled to be recorded shall contain at least
the following information with respect to the lease: The name of the lessor and the name of the lessee and the addresses of such parties as set
forth in the lease; a reference to the lease, with its date of execution; a
description of the leased premises in the form contained in the lease; the
term of the lease, with the date of commencement and the date of termination of such term, and if there is a right of extension or renewal, the
maximum period for which, or date to which, the lease may be extended,
or the number of times or date to which it may be renewed and the date
or dates on which such rights of extension or renewal are exercisable.
Such memorandum shall constitute notice of only the information contained therein."
33 the court
In one of its early decisions, in Pack v. Hansbarger,
noted that the West Virginia statute is based upon a Virginia statute
which became effective on July 1, 1850, and was copied, without alteration or amendment, into the West Virginia Code.34 However, the Virginia statute was in fact an amendment to an earlier commonwealth
statute.3 5 In Pack, the court explained the amendment of the statute to
include contracts for the sale of real estate (i.e., to make them record-

able rights) as follows:
The amendment of the statute so as to include contracts in writing for the
conveyance or sale of real estate for a term greater than five years, may
have been induced by the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of
Withers v. Carter et al., 4. Gratt. 407. The effect of the amendment was
to place such written contracts unrecorded upon the same footing, as to
creditors and purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, as unrecorded deeds. This being so, then every unrecorded or unregistered con-

32. W. VA. CODE § 40-1-8 (Supp. 1995).
33. 17 W. Va. 313 (1880).
34. Id. at 334-35.
35. Id. at 335.
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tract in writing for the conveyance or sale of real estate for a greater term
than five years since the 1st day of July, 1850, is void as to creditors and
purchasers for valuable consideration, without notice, the same as an unrecorded or unregistered deed conveying such real estate, or term, is now
and would
have been under the statute, and as it was before the amend36
ment.

In tracing the origins of this Section of the recording acts, the
court in Pack provided some insight as to why the provisions concerning contracts evolved as part of West Virginia Code Section 40-1-8, as
opposed to Section 40-1-9, and were incorporated by reference into
Section 40-1-9. In addition, the Pack decision also provided one of the
earliest policy discussions of the recording acts in our state.
As noted above, a written contract described in West Virginia
Code Section 40-1-8 "shall, from the time it is duly admitted to record, be, as against creditors and purchasers, as valid as if the contract
were a deed conveying the estate or interest embraced in the contract."37 Therefore, under the provisions of Section 40-1-8, the contracts described therein are equated to a deed for recording purposes,
that is, such contracts become "recordable."
The significance of being a "recordable interest" is that until it is
recorded, those who are described in West Virginia Code Section 40-19 can take "free" of the unrecorded interest. In effect the provisions of
Section 40-1-9 alter the common law rule, to the extent that it applies,
of "first in time, first in right." Section 40-1-9 provides:
Every such contract, every deed conveying any such estate or term,
and every deed of gift, or trust deed or mortgage, conveying real estate
shall be void, as to creditors, and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, until and except from the time that it is duly
admitted to record in the county wherein the property embraced in such
contract, deed, trust deed or mortgage may be. 8

36. Id. at 335-36.
37. W. VA. CODE § 40-1-8 (Supp. 1995).

38. W. VA. CODE § 40-1-9 (1982). See also W. VA. CODE § 39-1-2 (1982) (Setting
forth the requirements for an instrument to be recordable as follows:
The clerk of the county court of any county in which any deed, contract, power of
attorney, or other writing is to be, or may be, recorded, shall admit the same to
record in his office, as to any person whose name is signed thereto, when it shall
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Although the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has
never used the label "notice" to describe this statute, it is clear from
its decisions that West Virginia is a "notice" jurisdiction as to "purchasers." 9 This classification has been recognized by the American
Law of Property which includes West Virginia on its list of the twenty-five (25) states with notice statutes. 41 Patton on Titles also classifies West Virginia as a "notice type" jurisdiction, 4' and Dean Clyde
Colson, in his 1954 law review article entitled Limits of Title Search
Under the West Virginia Recording Act, concurred in this classification.42 Dean Colson stated: "As between two successive grantees from
the same grantor, it is abundantly clear from the West Virginia cases
that priority depends not upon priority of recording but solely upon
whether the second grantee at the time he became a purchaser had
actual or constructive notice of the prior conveyance." 3 The two West
Virginia cases cited by Dean Colson in support
of this statement are
45
Riddle.
v.
Cross
and
Andrews
v.
Alexander

have been acknowledged by him, or proved by two witnesses as to him, before
such clerk of the county court.
But notwithstanding such acknowledgement or proof, such clerk shall not
admit to record any contract deed, deed of trust mortgage or other instrument that
secures the payment of any debt, unless such contract, deed, deed of trust, mortgage, or other instrument sets forth therein who, at the time of the execution and
delivery thereof, is the beneficial owner of the debt secured thereby, and where he
resides: Provided, however, that in the case of a mortgage or a deed of trust securing an issue of negotiable notes or bonds exceeding five in number and payable
to bearer, it shall not be necessary that the mortgage or deed of trust show who
are the beneficial owners of such notes or bonds, but in such case such mortgage
or deed of trust shall show the name and address of the person or corporation
with or by whom the notes or bonds have been, or are to be, first negotiated.).
39. The West Virginia statute as to creditors will be discussed below.
40. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.5, at 540 nn.37 & 38, 545 n.63 (1952).
41. RUFFORD G. PATrON & CARROLL G PATrON, PATRON ON TITLES § 9 n. 19 (2d
ed. 1957) [hereinafter PArrON].
42. Clyde L. Colson, Limits of Title Search Under the West Virginia Recording Act,
56 W. VA. L. REv. 20 (1954) [hereinafter Colson].
43. Colson, supra note 42, at 24.
44. 64 S.E.2d 487 (W. Va. 1951).
45. 177 S.E. 870 (W. Va. 1934).
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The feature that distinguishes a notice jurisdiction from race and
race-notice jurisdictions is that the subsequent purchaser's rights are
determined at the time of the "conveyance transaction" based upon
notice or the lack thereof. Whether the prior grantee or the subsequent
grantee "records" first is not material. This point is well illustrated in
Cross v. Riddell. 6 In that case, the Crosses executed a deed of trust
on their farm to secure a bank loan in the amount of $3,000. 47 The
loan became delinquent and the trustee was directed to sell the property.4" Riddell, at the urging of a friend, made sufficient payments on
the loan to stop the sale.49 For making the payments, Riddell was given an absolute deed to the farm by the Crosses. ° Riddell made additional payments on the bank loan and then sold the farm to Farkas by
a deed dated October 12, 1932."' In that deed, Farkas assumed the
existing debt to the bank and agreed to pay Riddell an additional
$1,500.52 The Riddell-to-Farkas deed was recorded on October 22,
1932.13 When the Crosses refused to move from the land, Farkas
brought an unlawful detainer action against them." The Crosses defended the unlawful detainer action by claiming they had a "declaration
of trust" agreement with Riddell which provided that they had until
March 1, 1933, to repay Riddell all she had expended and redeem the
farm. In agreeing with Farkas that she was an innocent purchaser for
value, the court said:
At the time of her purchase [(October 12, 1932)], the title, so far as the
records in the county clerk's office revealed, was in Fay Riddell. The fact
that the undated declaration of trust was recorded two days prior to October 22nd, the date that Mrs. Farkas actually recorded her deed, has no

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
presented

Id.
Cross, 177 S.E. at 870.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 870-71.
Id. at 871.
Id.
Cross, 177 S.E. at 871.
Id.
Id. Riddell denied any such agreement and further denied that she signed the paper
at the trial. Id.
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bearing on the latter's title, if she was an innocent purchaserfor value at
the time of the delivery of the deed. 6

One of the most informative of the West Virginia recording cases
is Alexander v. Andrews. 7 Alexander interprets and explains the application of West Virginia Code Section 40-1-9 and sets forth the burden
of proof thereunder. In Alexander, Thomas A. and Mary J. Alexander,
husband and wife, were the owners of the real estate in question. 8
On April 25, 1946, Mary died and devised her interest to her son,
Charles B. Alexander. 9 On May 8, 1946, Thomas A. Alexander, executed, acknowledged, and presumably delivered a deed for his one-half
interest in the real estate to Sarah R. Andrews, his daughter.60 The
deed to Sarah was not recorded until July 8, 1946.61 Notwithstanding
the May 8 deed to his daughter, on May 14, 1946, Thomas A. Alexander, executed, acknowledged, and delivered a deed for his interest in
the same real estate to his son, Charles B. Alexander. 2 The deed to
Charles was recorded on May 14, 1946.3 Prior to the May 14 conveyance, the property in question had been occupied by Charles and
after the May 14 conveyance, the grantor, Thomas, lived on the property with his son until Thomas' death in October, 1948." Charles de-

56. Id. (emphasis added). As to the presence of the Crosses on the land constituting
inquiry notice, the court said:
If the presence of the Crosses on the property was sufficient to put Mrs.
Farkas on notice, and make further inquiry necessary concerning the Crosses' interest, Mrs. Farkas' rights could be affected only to the extent of the Crosses' interest therein, which, according to the latter, was the right to redeem prior to March
1, 1933. The Crosses do not show that a tender was ever made to Fay Riddell, as
provided for in the alleged "declaration of trust"; or that they were prevented from
so doing by any fraud upon the part of either Mrs. Riddell or Mrs. Farkas. And,
according to the Crosses' own testimony, the date for redemption had passed long
prior to the institution of this suit.
Id. (citations omitted).
57. 64 S.E.2d 487 (W. Va. 1951).
58. Id at 488.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Alexander, 64 S.E.2d at 488-89.
63. Id. at 489.
64. Id.
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nied any knowledge of the prior deed to his sister until he received a
tax notice in January, 1949, which included his sister's name, and upon
inquiry he learned of the May 8, 1946, deed from his father to Sarah.

65

As part of its decision, the court explained the effect of the recording acts upon the common law principle of "first in time, first in
right" as follows:
It is well to state at this time that the validity of the deed from
Thomas A. Alexander to Sarah R. Andrews, dated May 8, 1946, as of the
date of its execution, is not questioned. It follows, therefore, that if the
said deed had been recorded prior to the 14th day of May, 1946, when
the plaintiff obtained a deed for the same property, plaintiff would have
taken nothing by his deed. When Thomas A. Alexander executed the deed
of May 8, 1946, he parted with all of his right title and interest in the
property conveyed, and thereafter had no interest therein which he could
convey. But our recording Act, Code, 40-1-9, makes a perfectly valid and
effective conveyance void as to creditors and subsequent purchasers for
valuable consideration without notice, until such deed is duly admitted to
record in the county wherein the property conveyed is situated; and, therefore, while the grantor has nothing to convey, when he executes a subsequent deed for the same property, to a different party, then by force of
this statute, his grantee in the subsequent deed gets title to the land in
cases where the grantee in the first deed fails to record his deed before
the second deed is executed, and where the grantee in the second deed can
qualify as a purchaser for value and without notice of the first deed. Probably the explanation for this illogical result is that the first purchaser, who
fails to record his deed, is charged with fault in a situation where one of
two persons must suffer loss, in which situation it seems just, and our
statute, in effect, provides that the loss must fall upon the person who has
committed a fault in failing to record his deed, and by his fault has created a situation where a subsequent innocent purchaser is induced to part
with his money and thereby suffer a loss which the grantee in the first
deed could have prevented. Aside from the statute, a bona fide purchaser
for value and without notice is a favorite with a court of equity."
After quoting West Virginia Code Section 40-1-9, the court continued:

65. Id.
66. Id. at 490 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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It is clear that if the plaintiff in this case purchased the real estate here
involved, without notice of the execution of the prior deed, and paid in
full a valuable consideration for his deed, he is entitled under the statute
to the relief prayed for; but he must meet the conditions which give him
the right to such relief. The first and most important condition is that at
the time he accepts his conveyance and becomes a complete purchaser he
has had no notice, actual or constructive, of the existence of a former
deed to another person for the same property. In this case, if the former
deed had been recorded prior to the May 14, 1946 deed, the question of
actual notice would not be involved, because the recordation furnished
what is termed constructive notice thereof. In this case, however, admittedly the deed of May 8, 1946, to Sarah R. Andrews, had not been recorded
at the time plaintiff took his deed on May 14, 1946. On that point of the
case the only question involved is whether plaintiff had actual notice of
the existence of such deed, or notice of matters and things which called
upon him to make inquiry before becoming the purchaser of the property
involved.
The other necessary conditions are that he must pay a valuable consideration; the transaction upon which the second purchaser relies must be
bonafide; must have been completed; and the entire purchase price paid.67
Since the issue of "notice" is determinative, the burden of proof in
a notice jurisdiction is important. In addressing this issue, the Alexan-

der court stated:
[O]n the question of burden of proof, it seems to us that once a person,
who it is claimed has had notice, denies the same, then the burden of
proof shifts and the person who asserts that notice has been had must
establish the facts and circumstances which clearly indicate notice, which,
of course, under the statute, would in a case such as is now before us,
prevent him from receiving the benefits of the statute quoted above [(W.
Va. Code § 40---19)].6"
In applying the law with respect to the burden of proof to the facts of
the case, the court concluded that there was nothing in the record to
show that Charles had notice or should have been on inquiry as to the
May 8 deed to his sister.69

67. Id
68. Alexander, 64 S.E.2d at 491.
69. The court stated:
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Having determined that Charles was without notice of the earlier
deed, the court turned to the issue of whether Charles was a "purchaser." While there was conflicting evidence, the court concluded that
consideration given by Charles was $1000 in cash and an agreement to
take care of and provide for his father's burial.70 The market value of
the property in question in May of 1946 was stipulated to be
$7,700.71 In discussing the term "purchaser" as used in the recording
acts, the court established the definition of value as follows:
We do not understand that to place a person in a position to take the
benefit of the recording statute there must be paid as consideration what
would be termed the full value of the property. We think that what is
required is a consideration which would sustain a conveyance in the ordinary transaction where consideration becomes important. Of course, in the
absence of creditors, a person may convey his property on whatever terms
he chooses; but in a transaction such as is now before us, we think a
reasonably adequate consideration should be paid by a subsequent grantee,
before the person who claims under the first deed may be deprived of the
benefit of his conveyance. We are of the opinion that the consideration
shown here is sufficient to give to the plaintiff the benefit of Code, 40-19, had it been paid in full at the time the grantee in the May 14, 1946,
deed first received notice of the former deed.'

On the question of notice, we do not think the record shows that Charles B. Alexander had notice of the deed of May 8, 1946, at the time he accepted delivery of
his deed for the property here involved; nor do we think it shows that he was
acquainted with any fact or circumstance which would have required him to make
inquiry or investigation as to the state of title before accepting his deed. All of the
cases bearing upon the subject of notice hold that a showing of notice is made
where a person is charged with facts and circumstances which require him to make
inquiry as to matters of which notice or lack of notice is required. We find nothing in this record that goes that far. If he had received any indication of the existence of this former deed, and had searched the records, he would not have found
any deed recorded. How far he would have been required to go on line of inquiry,
we do not know. We think the court erred in holding that the plaintiff had actual
notice of the execution of the deed of May 8, 1946, at the time he obtained his
deed for the same property.
Id. at 492.
70. Id. at 493.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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The final issue in the case involved the fact that the entire consideration was not paid on the date of the conveyance. Charles' agreement
to care for his father and provide for his burial extended into the future, and Thomas lived for two and one-half years after delivery of the
deed. The significance of this fact was reflected by the court quoting
from one of its earlier decisions as follows: "'To be protected by section 5, chapter 74, of the Code [(Code, 40-1-9)], against a prior unrecorded deed, one: must be a complete purchaser, must have had no
notice of the prior contract or deed, and have paid all the purchase
money for the land purchased by him."'73
The court explained Charles' failure to qualify as a "complete
purchaser" as follows:
We are of the opinion that the record shows that $1,000 was paid by the

plaintiff to his father at or before the conveyance of May 14, 1946, and
we think the record shows there was an agreement between the parties to
that deed that the plaintiff would take care of his father and see that he
had a suitable burial. However, unless it be from May 8, 1946 to July 8,
1946, when the Sarah R. Andrews deed was recorded, that part of the
consideration had not been paid, and, therefore, the transaction had not
been completed by the full payment of the purchase money. Assuming for
the sake of argument that the plaintiff undertook to take care of his father
during his lifetime, and provided for his burial, it would be no different
than if he had executed a note or notes for given amounts to make up a
reasonably adequate consideration for the conveyance.
On the subject of consideration, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff in order to receive the benefit of the statute must have paid a reasonably adequate one. We have a stipulation in the record that the value of
the one-half interest in the property here involved, as of May, 1946, was
$3,850. We do not think the $1,000 cash payment was an adequate consideration, and it is clear that the other elements of consideration which
were necessary to make the deed valid in the circumstances were not paid
at the date of the conveyance to the plaintiff.
We must appraise the rights of the plaintiff as they existed immediately prior to the recordation of the deed of May 8, 1946 to Sarah R.
Andrews. Code, 40-1-9, provides that: "Every such contract, * * * shall be
void as to creditors, and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration

73. Id. at 494 (quoting United Fuel Gas Co. v. Morley Oil and Gas Co., 131 S.E.
716 (W. Va. 1926)).
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without notice, until and except from the time that it is duly admitted to
record in the county wherein the property * * * may be."
The plaintiff having obtained a legal advantage through the failure of
Sarah R. Andrews to record her deed of May 8, 1946, promptly lost that
advantage when said deed was recorded on July 8, 1946. The very terms
of the statute force that conclusion. Therefore, after the deed of May 8,
1946, was recorded, it became effective for all purposes, and the grantee
in the subsequent deed of May 14, not having completed his purchase,
could obtain no rights based upon the payments thereafter made. His
rights, whatever they are, must be based upon his situation on the date
when he first had actual or constructive notice of the deed of May 8,
1946. He says that he did not have actual notice thereof until one or one
and one-half years after he received his deed, but we think this immaterial
because he received constructive notice thereof on July 8, 1946, when the
first deed was recorded.7 4

In summary, the Alexander case held that Charles had no notice,
either actual or constructive, of the earlier deed to his sister at the time
his father delivered the deed to him and under the recording acts
Charles was, therefore, protected to the extent he paid consideration at
the time of the delivery of his deed. However, Charles was charged
with constructive notice when his sister recorded her earlier deed for
the same real estate on July 8, 1946. Therefore, after July 8, 1946,
Charles was no longer protected as a purchaser without notice under
the recording acts.
E. The West Virginia Recording Acts: "Notice" is Not a Hindrance to
"Creditors"
While West Virginia is a "notice" jurisdiction as to "purchasers,"
under our statutes, notice of an unrecorded deed is not relevant as to
"creditors." The distinction, in this respect, between purchasers and
creditors is based upon the wording of Section 40-1-9. The statute
reads:
Every such contract, every deed conveying any such estate or term, and
every deed of gift, or trust deed or mortgage, conveying real estate shall
be void, as to creditors, and subsequent purchasersfor valuable consider-

74. Id. at 494.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1996

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:449

ation without notice, until and except from the time that it is duly admitted to record in the county wherein the property embraced in such contract, deed, trust deed or mortgage may be. 5

It was established very early that the words "for valuable consideration without notice" applied only to "subsequent purchasers" and not
to "creditors." The court, in Syllabus Point 2 of Delaplain & Son v.
Wilkinson & Co., stated:
It is immaterial whether the creditor has notice or not, when the debt was
contracted. The statute declares it void as to all creditors, without discrimi76
nating as it does in the clause touching purchasers, in respect to notice.

The difference under the statute between a "purchaser" and a "creditor"
is summarized in Acadian Coal & Lumber Co. v. Brooks Run Lumber
Co.,"7 as follows:
[A lien creditor's] status is fixed by the record, and not by actual notice,
while a purchaser is bound by actual notice, and, if he has such notice or
notice of facts sufficient to put him upon inquiry, it is immaterial whether
7
the instrument of which he has such notice is recorded or not. 1

In this respect, it is noted that a judgment becomes a lien against
real estate as provided by, and from the time set forth in, West Virginia Code Section 38-3-6, 7 but the judgment does not constitute a lien

W. VA. CODE § 40-1-9 (1982) (emphasis added).
76. 17 W. Va. 242, 244, Syl. Pt. 2 (1880). The court in Abney v. Ohio Lumber &
Mining Co., 32 S.E. 256, 256 (W. Va. 1898), stated the same principle in Syllabus Point 4
as follows: "An unrecorded deed is void as to creditors, whether they have notice or not,
but it will be good against purchasers with notice, or who have not purchased for valuable
.consideration."
77. 107 S.E. 422 (W. Va. 1921).
78. Id. at 426.
79. W. VA. CODE § 38-3-6 (1985). The full text of this statute provides:
Every judgment for money rendered in this State, other than by confession in
vacation, shall be a lien on all the real estate of or to which the defendant in
such judgment is or becomes possessed or entitled, at or after the date of such
judgment, or if it was rendered in court, at or after the commencement of the
term at which it was so rendered, if the cause was in such condition that a judgment might have been rendered on the first day of the term; but if from the nature of the case judgment could not have been rendered at the commencement of
the term, such judgment shall be a lien only on or after the date on which such
75.
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as against a "purchaser of real estate for valuable consideration without
notice, unless it" 80 is docketed in accordance with Section 38-3-5.
The construction of these sections is illustrated by the case Cooper
v. Cooper.8" In Cooper, attorneys were representing the defendant in a
lawsuit alleging alienation of affection." The attorneys accepted a
note secured by a deed of trust on their client's property to insure the
payment of their attorney fees for their representation of the defendant
in the alienation of affection suit and in several other law suits.83 The
deed of trust was recorded on October 14, 1953, and a judgment was
returned in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant in the alienation
of affection case on November 17, 1953 which under the statute, Sec-

judgment or decree could have been rendered and not from the commencement of
the term; but this section shall not prevent the lien of a judgment or decrees from
relating back to the first day of the term merely because the case shall be set for
trial or hearing on a later day of the term, if such case was matured and ready
for hearing at the commencement of the term, not merely because an office judgment in a case matured and docketed at the commencement of the term does not
become final until a later day of the term. A judgment by confession in vacation
shall also be a lien upon such real estate, but only from the time of day at which
such judgment is confessed. Such lien shall continue so long as such judgment remains valid and enforceable, and has not been released or otherwise discharged.
Id.
80. W. VA. CODE § 38-3-7 (1985). The full text of this statute provides:
No judgment shall be a lien as against a purchaser of real estate for valuable consideration without notice, unless it be docketed according to the fifth section [§38-3-5] of this article, in the county wherein such real estate is, before a
deed therefor to such purchaser is delivered for record to the clerk of the county
court [county commission] of such county; nor shall such judgment, though it be
docketed as aforesaid, be a lien, after ten years from its date as against such a
purchaser who purchases after such ten years, unless within such ten years an
execution shall have issued on such judgment and such execution or a copy thereof
be filed in the office of such clerk, or, unless such purchaser have actual notice of
the fact that such execution was issued, though it was not so filed; nor shall such
judgment, though it be docketed as aforesaid, and though one or more executions
shall have issued thereon and shall have been filed as aforesaid, be a lien, after
ten years from the date of the last execution so filed, as against such a purchaser
who purchases after such ten years, unless such purchaser have notice of the issuing of an execution within ten years preceding the date of such purchase.
Id. (emphasis added).
81. 98 S.E.2d 769 (W. Va. 1957).
82. Id. at 770.
83. Id.
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tion 38-3-6, became effective on September 2, 1953, the first day of
the September 1953 term of court.8" The plaintiff thus became a judgment creditor against the defendant, and the court held this judgment
prevailed over the attorneys deed of trust because the attorneys had
actual notice that the plaintiffs claim could result in a judgment and
its resulting lien. Since the attorneys had actual notice, the plaintiffs
judgment lien, which related back to the first day of the term, took
priority over the attorneys' deed of trust.86 The applicable law was
succinctly stated in the earlier case of Richardson v. White87 as follows: "[the statute], relating to judgment liens, was enacted for the
protection of purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice,
and has no application as between the judgment creditor and his debt8
or,,
or" 88
F. The West Virginia Recording Acts: While "Mortgagees" are "Purchasers" Under the Statutes, Not All "Creditors" are "Creditors"
As the above discussion illustrates, under the West Virginia recording acts, it can make a difference whether one is considered a "purchaser" or a "creditor." As the Alexander case establishes, to be a
"purchaser" one must pay "a reasonably adequate consideration,"89 and
to be fully protected under the statues, must be a "complete purchaser," that is, pay the full amount of the reasonably adequate consideration.9" Also, in contrast with sales transactions covered by the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) where a "pre-existing debt" is deemed
sufficient,9 the law in West Virginia prior to the adoption of the

84. Id. at 771.
85. Id. at 772.
86. Id. at 773.
87. 127 S.E. 636 (W. Va. 1925).
88. Id. (syllabus of the court).
89. 64 S.E.2d at 493.
90. In Alexander, the court recognized that Charles was protected to the extent he paid
consideration, the $1,000 cash and the sum expended taking care of his father until July 8,
1946, when the deed to his sister was recorded. 64 S.E.2d at 494.
91. The Uniform Commercial Code defines "value" as follows:
Except as otherwise provided with respect to negotiable instruments and bank collections (Sections 3-303, 4-208 and 4-209) a person gives "value" for rights if he
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U.C.C. was that "to constitute one a bona fide purchaser he must[,] at
the time he consummates the transaction[,] advance a new and valid
consideration .... ."' Similarly in the sole syllabus point of London
& Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America v. Cromwell,93 the court stated that "[u]nder the recording acts, a past consideration, alone, is not a
valuable consideration for the assignment of a chose in action, other
than a negotiable instrument."94 Since the U.C.C. does not apply to
real estate transactions, this aspect of the law remains unchanged.
It is well-established in West Virginia that for the purpose of the
recording laws, a party secured by a deed of trust or mortgage is considered a "purchaser." In Weinberg v. Rempe95 the court expressed the
law in unambiguous language:
A deed of trust unrecorded is void as against subsequent purchasers
without notice. A deed of trust creditor is held to be entitled as a purchaser within the purview and meaning of the said 5th section of said ch. 74
of the Code.[96] A mortgagee is also a purchaser within the sense of the

said 5th section.97

Perhaps it is helpful to think of such a secured transaction as one
in which the party who loans the money in effect "purchases" a security interest in the collateral to secure the repayment of the loan.
It is equally well established that under the recording acts, the
term "creditors" does not include all "creditors." In Moore v.
Tearney,98 the plaintiff contended that the unrecorded deed from Hurst
to Tearney was void as to all creditors including general creditors. The

acquires them . . . (b) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-

existing claim; ....
U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (1961).
92. Richlands Brick Corp. v. Hurst Hardware Co., 92 S.E. 685, 685 (W. Va. 1917).
93. 190 S.E. 337 (W. Va. 1937).
94. Id. at 337 (syllabus of the court).
95. 15 W. Va. 829 (1879).
96. The referenced 5th section of chapter 74 was the predecessor to present West
Virginia Code Section 40-1-9.
97. Weinberg, 15 W. Va. at 858 (citation omitted). See also Duncan v. Custard, 24
W. Va. 730 (1884).
98. 57 S.E. 263, 264 (W. Va. 1907).
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court's response to this argument was succinctly stated in Syllabus
Point 1 as follows:
The class of creditors intended to be protected by section 3103 Code
1906 [(present day West Virginia Code Section 40-1-9)], against an unrecorded deed, are not general creditors, but such creditors as have a lien
upon or a right to charge with their debts or demands the property conveyed by such deed.99
The law is further illustrated in Birch River Boom & Lumber Co.
v. Glendon Boom & Lumber Co.,' which involved "creditors" rights
against an unrecorded deed of trust. In that case, the court stated:
The creditors protected by that statute [(Section 5 of Chapter 74, now
West Virginia Code Section 40-1-9)] are lien creditors, having right to
charge the property directly by execution, attachment or otherwise, not
holders of mere personal demands or claims. The section applies to both
real and personal property. As applied to real estate, it protects only lien
creditors.'
Finally as to the terms "creditors" and "purchasers" it is provided
by statute that:
The words creditors and purchasers, where used in this chapter, shall
not be restricted to the protection of creditors of, and purchasers from, the
grantor, but shall extend to and embrace all creditors and purchasers who,
but for the deed or writing, would have had title to the property conveyed, or a right to subject it to their debts." 2

I][I.

ESTABLISHING THE CHAIN OF TITLE

As noted in the introduction, the only way to perform a "complete" title examination is to trace the title of each tract back to the
patent. The time and, therefore, the expense to perform such a "com-

99.
100.
101.
trust or
removed

Id at 263, Syl. Pt. 1.
76 S.E. 972 (W. Va. 1912).
Id. at 974. Prior to 1963, West Virginia Code Section 40-1-9 applied to deeds of
mortgages conveying "real estate, goods and chattels." Goods and chattels were
from this section in 1963 with the adoption of the U.C.C.
102. W. VA. CODE § 40-1-14 (1982).
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plete" title examination makes such title work impractical in most
residential and maybe commercial transactions. Therefore, once the
attorney makes a decision not to trace the title to the patent, the next
question is how far back in time should the attorney check title? At
best, the answer to this question is no more than a "rule of thumb."
As a practical matter, since most purchasers of a residence need to
obtain a purchase money loan, traditionally the local bank's standards
for title certification have established the minimum time period. However, with the increased number of loans now being packaged and sold
on the secondary market, the requirements for such loans, including
title insurance, have had a major impact on "local" title work.
In 1960, Professor Lewis M. Simes prepared Model Title Standards under the auspices of the University of Michigan Law School
and the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association. Based upon the assumption that the Model Marketable Title Act was in force, Standard 4.2 adopted an unbroken chain
of title extending back at least forty years." 3 In West Virginia, most
title insurance companies and lending institutions require a sixty-year
search which originates from a general warranty deed. 04
Thus, for purposes of discussion, assume that a title examination
covering sixty years from the present date to a general warranty deed
is sufficient to satisfy the financial institution lending the money and
the residential title insurance company. While sixty years may be sufficient for the lending institution's loan documentation purposes, it is
important to stress that it may not be sufficient to adequately represent
and advise a client as to matters that may be very important to him or
her. For example, in many, if not most, parts of the state, coal, oil,
and gas were frequently "severed" from the surface beginning in the
late 1800s. In certain areas of the state the severance of oil and gas
and certain seams of coal was essentially completed by the 1920s. Not
only is the extent of the ownership of the "corpus" usually of importance to the present owner, but the nature and extent of the "mining

103. Lnvis M. SImEs, MODEL TriLE STANDARDS 24 (1960).
104. Although the author has no empirical data to support the statement, based upon
conversation with a number of lawyers who are engaged in a substantial amount of title
work, sixty years appears to be a common, acceptable rule of thumb.
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rights" associated with the severance is normally important to the current "surface owner." In addition, a variety of rights-of-way or easements may have been created more than sixty years ago. Obviously, if
the subject property is burdened by easements, the easement could
materially affect the utilization of the servient estate. These two exam-

ples illustrate the types of transactions which commonly may have
occurred in West Virginia more than sixty years ago, and if they are
within the tract's chain of title, could affect the property.'
Perhaps the appropriate suggestion of how far back one should run

a title is that the sixty years required by title insurance companies and
many local banks should be viewed as the minimum period of time
and that various "local factors" may either justify or necessitate that
the title be run back even further in order to adequately advise the
client as to matters that may be important. to him or her." 6 Obviously, it is this issue which has provided some of the impetus for marketable title statutes."0 7

105. On February 20, 1995, House Bill 2562 (HB 2562), a bill patterned after the Uniform Marketable Title Act was introduced in the West Virginia House of Delegates and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. H. 2562, 73d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1995). The
marketable title period provided for in the draft legislation was thirty years. Id. Consideration of the bill by the committee was delayed so that careful consideration could be given
to the effect such a bill would have on all property interests in West Virginia.
106. It may be sufficient to advise the client that in that particular portion of the county within which s/he seeks to purchase, the coal was severed in the 1910s and 1920s, and
that the severance deeds generally granted extensive mining rights with no obligation to
provide support of the surface, and that since the title examination stopped in the 1930s, the
client should assume such a severance has occurred and that extensive mining rights were
granted. If the client desires, "additional" title work could be performed to verify this assumption and provide a precise statement of the mining rights.
107. H. 2562, 73d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1995) (Proposing an amendment to Chapter 36
of the Code to be known as the Uniform Marketable Title Act. The proposal did not pass,
but was recommended for study and for policy impact consideration.).
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IV. TITLE TRANSFER

There are basically three ways"'8 that the title to real property is
transferred or acquired. The most common transfer is by deed. The
other principal method of transfer is when the owner dies and the
property passes at his or her death by either testate or intestate succession."°9 Finally, and although not nearly as common as the other two,
title to property can be acquired by the operation of law through adverse possession."'
A.

Deeds
1.

In General

Since a deed is the most common link in a chain of title, both the
form and contents of the deed are important to the title examiner. The
American Law of Property states that:
To be effective as a legal conveyance without reformation a deed must
have a grantor, grantee, words of grant, description of the land involved,
and signature of the grantor; also, in some states or as to certain types of
deeds, a seal, attestation, acknowledgement, or all of them. . . A deed
may be a very informal instrument and yet be perfectly good so long as it
contains items which the courts will construe as constituting these...

essentials."'

108. It is recognized that the sovereign and certain corporations are given the right to
acquire private property pursuant to eminent domain. See W. VA. CoNsT. art I1, § 9; Articles I and 2, Chapter 54 of the West Virginia Code.
109. See infra Part IX.A. for a discussion of the issues facing the title examiner when
title to land has passed by reason of death of the owner.
110. A discussion of adverse possession is beyond the scope of this article. Essentially,
adverse possession involves the passage of time set forth in the statute of limitation for
entry upon or recovery of lands (W. VA. CODE §§ 55-2-1, -la, -3, -4 (1994)) and the presence of certain elements established by the courts. A helpful discussion of the elements of
adverse possession is found in Core v. Faupel, 24 W. Va. 238 (1884); and Somon v. Murphy Fabrication & Erection Co., 232 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va. 1977).
111.

3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.38, at 279.
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West Virginia has provided statutory guidance as to both content and
form for deeds. One of the things the statutes have done is to abolish
the distinctions in legal effect of various types of deeds which developed and evolved as part of the English common law and were
brought to this country in the colonial period. The statute abolishing
common law forms of deeds stresses intent over form.
The statute states:
All distinctions in legal effect between deeds of grant, deeds of bargain and sale, deeds of lease and release, and deeds of covenant to stand

seized, are hereby abolished. Any instrument which shows on its face a
present intent to pass the title to, or any interest, present or future, in real
property, shall, if properly executed and delivered, be given effect according to its manifest intent. No instrument purporting to convey land, or any
interest therein, shall fail of effect merely for lack of conformity with the
language of sections five, six, seven, eight or nine of this article.""

In lieu of the "wordy" common law forms of deeds, the statutes provide a "bare bones" deed form."'
Another illustration of the emphasis on "intent" over "form" is
found in a companion section which abolishes the necessity of the
"seal" on such instruments. By statute, the need to affix a seal to a
deed, deed of trust, mortgage, or other conveyance has been abolished
in West Virginia"4 and the affixing of a seal to an instrument does
not give such instrument any additional force or effect." 5 The "seal"
112. W. VA. CODE § 36-3-4 (1985).
113. See W. VA. CODE § 36-3-5 (1985) (Providing:
A deed may be made in the following form, or to the same effect: "This
deed made the ......
.day of ........
., in the year ......
., between
(here insert names of parties), witnesseth: That in consideration of (here state the
consideration), the said ............
.grants
unto the said ............
all, etc. (Here describe the property, and insert covenants or any other provisions.)
Witness the following signature.).
In addition to the form deed in this Section, Section 36-3-8 sets forth a deed of lease and
Section 36-3-9 provides a form deed for use by a sheriff or special commissioner. W. VA.
CODE § 36-3-8, -9 (1982). A form trustee's deed is found in Section 38-1-6. W. VA. CODE
§ 38-1-6 (1985).
114. W. VA. CODE §§ 36-3-1, -2 (1985).
115. W. VA. CODE § 36-3-3 (1985).
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referred to in these sections is the "family seal" imprinted on docu-

ments at common law, and its successors, which evolved to nothing
more than the word "seal" after the signature line on some documents." 6
While the above discussion illustrates the emphasis on intent over
form,"' the contents of deeds are obviously very important. It is customary to include within the deed the date, and "in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, deeds are presumed to have been executed on
the day of their date.""' 8

2.

Granting Words

One of the essential requirements of a deed is the manifestation of
intention to transfer an estate or interest in land. The deed must have
operative words such as "do hereby grant and convey." This requirement is expressed in Freudenberger Oil Co. v. Simmons"9 as follows:
"Operative words manifesting intent to transfer the property are absolutely essential to the conveyance of title. The intent must be disclosed
1 20
by the words of the deed, not the mere acts of the parties.

116. The notarial seal as part of an acknowledgement is required by statute. W. VA.
CODE § 39-1-10 (1982). The seal discussed in West Virginia Section 39-1A-2 is not the
seal referred to in Sections 36-3-1, -2, and -3.
117. In Parson v. Baltimore Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 29 S.E. 999 (W. Va. 1898), the
court was presented with the question of whether an "agreement" was a deed. The "agreement'" labeled itself a deed and was signed, sealed, and acknowledged. The agreement concemed a party wall and provided that the expense of the wall would be a covenant running
with the land and not a personal obligation of the person not building the wall.
In holding the instrument a deed, the court noted it was "a mutual exchange of an
interest or easement in real estate" and explained, "[t]o make a good deed, a writing need
not be in any particular form or words, so the intention thereof is clear, and it is signed,
sealed, and delivered." Id. at 1000. As to the agreement before the court, the court found
the "intention of the parties and the interest acquired and conveyed are plainly written on
the face of this instrument, and therefore it must be regarded as a good deed for the purposes executed, and properly admitted to record." Id.
118. Dulin v. Ohio River R.R., 80 S.E. 145, 146 (W. Va. 1913). Syllabus Point 4
states: "Prima facie, the date of a deed is the day of its execution, notwithstanding it was
acknowledged at a later date." Id at 145, Syl. Pt. 4.
119. 83 S.E. 995 (W. Va. 1914).
120. Id. at 995, Syl. Pt. 9. See also Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 62 S.E.2d 337
(W. Va. 1950). In Uhl v. Ohio River R.R., 41 S.E. 340 (W. Va. 1902), the court ex-
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Where appropriate, operative words manifesting an intent to transfer are contained in the deed, the deed will convey the grantor's entire
interest unless a contrary intent is expressed."' In a recent decision,
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affinmed the "plain
meaning" of this statute as follows:
In Freudenberger Oil Co. v. Simmons, we noted that under W. Va.
Code 36-1-11 [1923] a deed conveying land, in absence of an exception to
the contrary, passes the entire interest of the grantor. Syl. pt. 1,
Freudenberger states:
A deed conveying lands, unless an exception is made
therein, conveys all the estate, right, title, and interest whatever, both
at law and in equity, of the grantor in and to such
22
lands.

The statute, however, does not expand the grant of a "mere easement"
into a "fee simple." In Uhl v. Ohio River Railroad,' the railroad argued that the conveyance of a fifty foot right of way conferred upon it
a right of absolute fee simple estate in the very corpus of the soil
carrying with it all minerals including the right to extract oil.1 24 The

plained:
Deeds have orderly parts, technical words of precise legal signification, and in
times gone by those parts and words, and the strict rule of construction of them,
have been rigorously observed, often defeating the manifest intention. Modem construction, however, has leaned towards the intention, overriding mere form and
technical words, and nowadays it may be said that the intention must rule the
construction in deeds as well as in wills. .

.

. For instance, deeds generally require

the word "grant," or the words "bargain and sell," or some technical word suitable
to the character of the conveyance. Such is formal conveyancing. But the word
"convey" is now held to be equivalent to the word "grant," even at common law.
41 S.E. at 343-44 (citations omitted). See also Chapman v. Charter, 34 S.E. 768 (W. Va.
1899).
121. See W. VA. CODE § 36-1-11 (1985) (Providing:
When any real property is conveyed or devised to any person, and no words
of limitation are used in the conveyance or devise, such conveyance or devise shall
be construed to pass the fee simple, or the whole estate or interest, legal or equitable, which the testator or grantor had power to dispose of, in such real property,
unless a contrary intention shall appear in the conveyance or will.).
122. Jolynne Corp. v. Michels, 446 S.E.2d 494, 502 (W. Va. 1994) (citations omitted).
123. 41 S.E. 340 (W. Va. 1902).
124. Id at 341.
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court rejected this argument and as to the application of this statute to
this situation the court said: "It is hardly worth while to refer to the
argument that our statute law governs the case."'"lz The court cited to
the statute form of deed and then quoted this section and stated that it
applies
provided the deed does convey the land itself; but, if it convey only an
easement, or other particular, limited, or restricted estate, it is not so. The
word "grant" in the form referred to must have a thing for it to operate
upon, a thing in the objective case; and its operation is limited to the
thing specified as granted, the thing shown by the whole deed to have
been intended to be granted, and, if that is only a right of way, the word

"grant" passes that only.'26

Related to Section 36-1-11, is Section 36-3-10, which provides that
"[e]very deed conveying land shall, unless an exception be made therein, be construed to include all buildings, privileges, and appurtenances
of every kind belonging to the lands therein embraced." '27 Again, at
a very early date in the state's history, the court held "[tihe statute,
declaring that a deed, unless an exception be contained in it, shall be
construed to include appurtenances, does not apply to the creation of
easements, but to the transfer of those already existing.""12
3.

Parties and Signatures

As one would anticipate, "[a] deed must have parties, grantor and
grantee."' 29 While the deed must have a grantor and grantee, there is
some latitude in the manner in which these parties must be named. In
Roberts v. Huntington Development & Gas Co.,1 30 the court responded to the argument that an instrument failed to convey title because it
failed to name grantees by holding that although the "deed" did not
specifically and particularly set forth the identity of the grantees, their

125. Id. at 344.
126. Id.
127. W. VA. CODE § 36-3-10 (1985).
128. Standiford v. Goudy, 6 W. Va. 364, 368 (1873) (emphasis added).

129. Johnson v. Riley, 23 S.E. 698, 701 (W. Va. 1895) (Brannon, J., dissenting).
130. 109 S.E. 348 (W. Va. 1921).
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identity was obvious by way of the language of the instrument. In so
holding, the court quoted, with approval, Devlin on Deeds, which
states: "The fact that a grantee is not described by name will not affect
the validity of a deed, if the designation or description be sufficient to
distinguish the person intended from the rest of the world."'' Similarly, the court, in Syllabus Point 3 of Blake v. Hendrick,3 1 said:
It is not essential that the grantor or grantee be formally named in
the granting clause of a deed, if by taking the whole instrument together,
they be sufficiently designated or described as to distinguish them from
the rest of the world, and there is no uncertainty as to the identity of
either party."
While there may be some leeway in the manner of identifying the
parties, the law is well-established that unless a party is "named" in
the deed as a grantor, that party's signature at the end of the deed will
not convey that party's interest in the land which is the subject of the
deed. In Adams v. Medsker," the deed was intended to convey the
land from the heirs of the decedent to a single heir. In the deed in
question, Thomas Lyons and wife were named as grantors, but they did
not execute the instrument. 35 However, Morgan Lyons and wife, who
were not mentioned as grantors, executed the instrument, and their signatures were acknowledged. 136 In deciding whether the interests of
either Thomas or Morgan and their respective spouses were conveyed
by this instrument, the court stated:
I have no hesitation in deciding that said deed did not convey the interest
of Morgan Lyons. While he signed and acknowledged it as his deed, he is
nowhere mentioned in it or made a party to it. . . . It is elementary law
that every deed must have a grantor as well as a grantee. . . . And no

one can be a party who is not mentioned or referred to therein. The mere
signing and acknowledging it, when there are grantors named in it, is
insufficient to make the person so signing it a party to it, even though it

131. Id. at 352 (quoting I DEvLIN ON DEEDs § 184).
132. 120 S.E. 906 (W. Va. 1924).
133. Id. at 906, Syl. Pt. 3.
134. 25 W. Va. 127 (1884).
135. Id. at 128-29.

136. Id.
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appeared by extrinsic evidence that he intended thereby to make it his deed.'37

As to Thomas, the court found his failure to sign the deed prevented it
from passing title to his interest.'
In deeds in which there are multiple grantors, the court, in Parrish
v. Pancake,39 held that where a deed lists several grantors, but only
some of those grantors listed execute and acknowledge the deed, the
instrument is effective and valid to pass title of those grantors executing and acknowledging it if their intention was to pass title. As to
those named as grantors who do not execute the deed, their interest
does not transfer. 40
4.

Consideration

While consideration does not need to be recited in the deed in
order to have a valid conveyance,14 ' the recital of consideration and
acknowledgement of its receipt has legal significance. This is illustrated
by the case of Farrar v. Young.142 In Farrar,the sons of the decedent attempted to set aside a deed their father made during his lifetime
to his granddaughter. 43 The deed in question recited that "'for and in
consideration of the sum of One Dollar ($1.00), and other good and
valuable consideration, cash in hand paid by the parties of the second

137.
138.
139.
140.

Idl at 130-31.
Id. at 131.
215 S.E.2d 659 (W.Va. 1975).
Id. at 664.
141. W. VA. CODE § 36-3-6 (1985) (Providing:
If a deed of real property is in other respects valid, it shall not fail for want
of a payment of consideration, or the recital of a consideration in the deed. No
resulting or other trust in favor of the grantor in such deed shall arise from the
mere fact that no consideration was paid or recited, if no trust was in fact intended. The foregoing provisions of this section shall not affect in any manner the
right of any party to the deed, or any other person, to have such conveyance set
aside for fraud, or because of any other circumstance which would render such
conveyance invalid as to such person.).
142. 216 S.E.2d 575 (W. Va. 1975).
143. Id. at 576-77.
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part unto the party of the first part, the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged * * *.,,,144 As to the recital in the deed, the court said:
It has consistently been held by this Court that the recital in a deed of the

payment of consideration, irrespective of the amount thereof, is prima
facie evidence of such payment and of the sufficiency of such consideration. In Lovett v. Eastern Oil Company, it was specifically held that the

recital of one dollar constitutes valuable consideration for the conveyance
of land.
There having been a recital, in the subject deed, of the payment and

receipt of consideration and there having been no offer of evidence that
the recited consideration was not paid or that there was any fraud involved, we hold that as a matter of law good and valuable consideration
supporting the subject conveyance has been paid. 45

While Syllabus Point 3 of the Farrardecision states: "Mere inadequacy of consideration is not in itself sufficient to justify a court of
equity in setting aside a deed[,]"' 46 the court qualified this absolute
statement in McElwain v. Wells'4 7 in acknowledging that had the consideration been "grossly inadequate" and enough to "shock a court's
conscience" it might look past the recital in the deed.'48
5.

Description

A deed which does not ascertain a legally adequate description is
fatally defective. As the court said in Meadow River Lumber Co. v.
Smith:149 "A purported conveyance of land is void, if the description
of the parcel attempted to be conveyed is so indefinite as not to be
capable of being made certain by extrinsic evidence."' 50
Whether a deed contains a sufficient description of the property to
be conveyed is by its nature very fact specific. The "definition" of

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id at 577 (quoting from subject deed).
Id. at 577-78 (citations omitted).
Id at 575, Syl. Pt. 3.
322 S.E.2d 482 (W. Va. 1984).
Id. at 485.
1 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 1939).
Id. at 169, Syl. Pt. 1.
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what constitutes a "sufficient description" in a deed was stated before
the turn of the century as follows:
The main object of a description of the land sold or conveyed, in a
deed of conveyance, or in a contract of sale, is not in and of itself to
identify the land sold,- that it rarely does or can do without helping evidence,- but to furnish the means of identification, and when this
5 is done it
is sufficient. That is certain which can thus be made certain.1 1
In reaffirming this general statement, the court in Harper v. Pauley'52
explained that the written description contained in the contract or deed
must provide the "key" or "foundation" words before extrinsic evidence
can be received to aid in the identification of the particular
property., The following passage from Harper provides insight into
the "key" or "foundation" words the court seeks:
The particular description in the writing involved in the instant proceeding does no more than mention a tract of land containing a certain
number of acres situated on a certain stream. No "key" or "foundation"
word or phrase is contained therein. The writing contained no reference to
any other instrument; no reference to the land by any name or designation;
no reference to any owner, or source of title; no reference to any occupancy at the date of the writing, or at any other date; and no reference to
any adjoining tract or tracts of land. The decisions of this Court clearly
hold that "key" or "foundation" words or phrases can not be supplied by
extrinsic evidence.'54
Just as a deed without a sufficient description is void for uncertainty, 155 an easement in a deed must be expressed in certain and definite language in order to be valid. In Highway Properties v. Dollar
Savings Bank, 56 the court held an easement across adjacent property
void because of uncertainty. The purported easement was "reserved" in
151. Thorn v. Phares, 14 S.E. 399, 399, Syl. Pt. 3 (W. Va. 1891). See also Consolidation Coal Co. v. Mineral Coal Co., 126 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1962); Holley v. Curry, 51
S.E. 135 (W. Va. 1905).
152. 81 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1953).
153. The Harper decision provides a helpful summary of a number of "description
cases" which, as stated above, tend to be fact specific.
154. 81 S.E.2d at 736.
155. Meadow River Lumber Co. v. Smith, I S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 1939).
156. 431 S.E.2d 95 (W. Va. 1993).
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a deed to Fayette Square as follows: "It is agreed and understood that
there is common parking and rights-of-way or easements in, to and
across all parcels for ingress and egress from and to all other par'
cels."157
The court in Highway Properties noted: 'In order to create
an exception or reservation in a deed which would reduce a grant in a
conveyance clause which is clear, correct and conventional, such exception or reservation must be expressed in certain and definite language.""'15 As to the language in the deed to Fayette Square, the
court explained that "[n]one of the easement language identified the
location or width of the easements on the land. The description contained nothing that would serve to specify in the slightest degree any
59
means of geographically locating the easement on the property.'
Finally, the court explained:
It should be noted that these rules regarding the sufficiency of the descrip-

tion of an easement contained in a deed apply only to the initial conveyance. The fact that subsequent deeds may refer generally to exceptions and
reservations of record or may make no such references does not diminish
the validity of the original easement if it previously was described adequately. The reason for this rule is because a purchaser of real property is
on notice as to
those matters which are contained in the chain of title to
6
the property. 0

6.

Exceptions and Reservations

As the court explained in Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,6'
"[t]hough technically there is a distinction between an exception and a
reservation, they are often regarded as synonymous.'

6

The technical

distinction between these two terms was explained in Malamphy v.
Potomac Edison Co.,163 as follows:

157. Id. at 97 (quoting from deed to Fayette Square).
158. Id at 98 (quoting from Hall v. Hartley, 119 S.E.2d 759, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va.
1961)).
159. Id.
160. Id at 100.
161. 62 S.E.2d 337 (W. Va. 1950).

162. Id. at 345.
163.

83 S.E.2d 755 (W. Va. 1954).
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An exception is language by which "* * * the grantor withdraws from the

operation of the conveyance that which is in existence, and included under
the terms of the grant." "A reservation "'is something arising out of the
thing granted, not then in esse, or some new thing created or reserved,
issuing or coming out of the thing granted, and not a part of the thing
itself, nor of anything issuing out of another thing."""

The court in Malamphy continued, "[n]otwithstanding that the language
in a deed of conveyance may be phrased as a 'reservation,' such language may be regarded and treated as an exception if it is necessary in
order to carry out the plain purposes of the parties to the instru165
ment."
Once there has been a valid exception created, the exception is

binding upon subsequent grantees in the chain of title even though
deeds subsequent to the deed in which the exception was first made do

not reference it. 66 Finally, just as a deed must contain an adequate
description of the property conveyed or an easement must be sufficiently described to be valid,

"'[a]n

exception in a deed conveying land

must describe the thing excepted with legal certainty, so as to be ascertained, else the thing sought to be excepted will pass to the grantee."

167

7.

Acknowledgement

While a proper acknowledgement is essential to make a deed a

"recordable" instrument, a proper acknowledgement is not necessary for

a deed to transfer title. As the court explained in McElwain v.
164. Id. at 758 (citations omitted). In Freeport Coal Co. v. Valley Point Mining Co.,
90 S.E.2d 296, 299 (W. Va. 1955), the court quoted Lord Coke's distinction between an
exception and reservation: "note a diversity between an exception (which is ever of part of
the thing granted and of a thing in esse) and a reservation, which is always of a thing not
in esse, but newly created, or reserved out of the land or tenement demised."
165. Malomphy, 83 S.E.2d at 758.
166. "'A right or interest reserved in a conveyance will be effective as against all who
deraign title through the grantee, although the reservation is not expressed in subsequent
deeds."' Malomphy, 83 S.E.2d at 759 (citation omitted). See also Highway Properties v.
Dollar Say. Bank, 431 S.E.2d 95 (W. Va. 1993).
167. Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 332 S.E.2d 597, 602 (W. Va. 1985) (quoting
Harding v. Jennings, 70 S.E. 1, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va. 1910)).
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Wells,'68 while an acknowledgement under section 39-1-2 is a prerequisite for recording, it
adds nothing to the validity of a deed as between the parties and others
who know about it. A defect in acknowledgement "does not detract from
the force of the deed in making effective the conveyance intended to be
made thereby." Even an unrecorded deed is good against a grantor and his
heirs ....169

In other words, the significance of the acknowledgement relates not to
the transfer of title but rather to the protection of the title transferred
by the deed. This aspect of law is well-summarized by the court in
South Penn Oil Co. v. Blue Creek Development Co. 7 ' Syllabus Point
2 reads: "A deed containing a certificate of acknowledgement unsigned
by the notary, by whom the acknowledgement purports to have been
taken, and not otherwise proven, is not a recordable paper."'' Syllabus Point 3 states:
The admission of a deed and an unsigned certificate of acknowledgement
thereon to record, by the clerk of the county court, and transcribing it into
the record book, does not constitute such deed a part of the record, so as
to affect a subsequent purchaser
of the land thereby conveyed with con72
structive notice thereof.

Since a valid acknowledgement is necessary for an instrument to
be recordable, what constitutes a valid acknowledgement is important.
The subject is primarily one of statutory regulation. The conditions
under which the clerk of the county commission shall admit documents
to record are set forth in Section 39-1-2.17 Form acknowledgements
are provided in Sections 39-1-4, -4a, -5, -8, and -9, while Section 39-

168. 322 S.E.2d 482 (W. Va. 1984).
169. Id. at 485 (citation omitted).
170. 88 S.E. 1029 (W. Va. 1916).
171. Id. at 1029, Syl. Pt. 2.
172. Id at 1029, Syl. Pt. 3; see also Ihrig v. Ihrig, 88 S.E. 1010 (W. Va. 1916).
173. W. VA. COD- § 39-1-2 (1982) (providing, in part: "The clerk of the county [commission] of any county in which any deed, contract, power of attorney, or other writing is
to be, or may be, recorded, shall admit the same to record in his office, as to any person
whose name is signed thereto, when it shall have been acknowledged by him, or proved by
two witnesses as to him, before such clerk of the county [commission]").
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1-3 defines who may take an acknowledgement. As to the necessity of
an official seal, Section 39-1-10 provides: "If any acknowledgement be
before a notary without this State, he shall certify the same under his
official seal.' 7 4 In 1971, West Virginia adopted the Uniform Recognition of Acknowledgement Act,175 and in 1994, the curative statute
as to defective acknowledgements found in Section 37-11-2 was
amended to change the elapsed time period from ten years to five
years.'76 Finally, in 1984, West Virginia adopted the Uniform Notary
Act.'77 While the Uniform Acts and form certificates have significantly reduced the likelihood of defective acknowledgements, mistakes in
acknowledgement still occur. Obviously, an acknowledgement would be
"defective" if taken by a person who has not been appointed pursuant
to the statutory provision' or whose term has expired.'79 An acknowledgement would also be "defective" if a notary from without
West Virginia failed to affix the official seal' or all of those named
in the instrument as parties and who sign the instrument are not named
in the acknowledgment.
Finally, in West Virginia, it has long been recognized that a party
to an instrument should not serve as a notary of that instrument. In
1883, the court in Tavenner v. Barrett,'' held that where a trustee in
a deed of trust acknowledged the signatures of the grantors in the deed
of trust, the acknowledgement was defective, and the recordation was,
therefore, improper. "[T]he fact that it may be copied upon the book
of records will not operate as constructive notice to [a] subsequent
purchaser."'8 The decision in Tavenner was followed in subsequent
cases13 until 1992, when it was overruled by the court in Galloway

174. W. VA. CODE § 39-1-10 (1982).
175. W. VA. CODE §§ 39-1A-1 to -9 (1982).
176. See W. VA. CODE § 29C-9-101 (1993).
177. Chapter 29C of the West Virginia Code.
178. W. VA. CODE § 29C-2-101 (1993).
179. W. VA. CODE § 29C-2-102 (1993) ("Notaries may perform notarial acts in any
part of this state for a term of ten years, unless sooner removed.").
180. See W. VA. CODE § 39-1-10 (1982).
181. 21 W. Va. 656 (1883).
182. Id. at 688.
183. See Dixon v. Hesper Coal & Coke Co., 130 S.E. 663 (W. Va. 1925); Central
Trust Co. v. Cook, 160 S.E. 561 (W. Va. 1931).
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v. Cinello."4 In Galloway, the attorney, who was the trustee in the
deed of trust, notarized the deed conveying the property and the deed
of trust securing the balance of the purchase price.'85 When the purchaser of the property (the grantors in the deed of trust) filed for
bankruptcy, the question before the bankruptcy court was whether the
seller had a perfected security interest. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals said the bankruptcy court ruled, based upon the
Tavenner case, that the seller (secured party under the deed of trust)
"had no security interest in the property."'86 Actually the United
States Bankruptcy Judge held "the Court is of the opinion that the
defendants have an unperfected security interest in the subject property."" 7 Following an appeal of the bankruptcy court's decision to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia,
the question was certified to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia.
It is submitted that upon careful reading, the Galloway decision
misconstrued existing West Virginia law. For example, the court in
Galloway stated: "The principal legal authority relied upon by the
bankruptcy court was Tavenner v. Barrett, where we invalidated a deed
of trust because its trustee had also notarized the instrument."' 188 As
noted above, in Tavenner, the court's holding only invalidated the
acknowledgement, not the instrument itself. The authorities which the
Tavenner court adopted as their own, expressed this point as follows:
The want of a proper acknowledgement does not however invalidate the
deed (of one sui juris) but only goes to the effect of the record. If not

acknowledged or proved, its record is not provided for by law, and the
fact that it may be copied upon the book of records will not operate as
constructive notice to subsequent purchaser. The deed however is good as
between the parties, (being suijuris)and should prevail against subsequent
deeds to those who had actual notice of its existence." 9

184.
185.
186.
187.
1991).
188.
189.

423 S.E.2d 875 (1992).
Id. at 877.
Id.
In re. Rochinich v. Cinello, Bk. No. 90-51048 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. Oct. 31,
Galloway, 423 S.E.2d at 877 (citation omitted).
21 W. Va. at 688 (citations omitted).
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As to other cases which followed Tavenner, the Galloway court said:
For example, in Central Trust Co. v. Cook, which involved another acknowledgement of a deed of trust by the trustee-notary, we merely cited

Tavenner and concluded in Syllabus Point 2: "An acknowledgement of a
trust deed by the grantors before the trustee as a notary public is invalid."

Similarly, in Dixon v. Harper Coal & Coke Co., a mortgage company had its deed of trust declared invalid because the trustee acknowledged the instrument. 9 '

The above quoted syllabus from Central Trust Co. correctly states
that the acknowledgement is invalid, and the court in Dixon actually
said: "Such an acknowledgement is invalid, and the recordation of the
deed does not entitle the claim of the Bellaire Company to the priority
accorded it by the court.. 19 Therefore, under the existing law, the
bankruptcy court's decision correctly stated that the deed of trust in
Galloway constituted an unperfected security interest. While the deed
of trust was valid between the parties, the fact that the trustee served
as notary only invalidated the acknowledgement, as opposed to the
instrument, and without a proper acknowledgement, the instrument was
not recordable. Since it was not "recordable," it did not serve as constructive notice. Therefore, the bankruptcy trustee, under the provisions
of Bankruptcy Code Section 544(a) 9 ' had priority over the deed of
trust which was not a recordable instrument because of the defective
acknowledgement. The question before the bankruptcy court was not
the validity of the deed of trust between the parties, but rather its
priority under bankruptcy law. As noted above, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Galloway said existing law invalidated the
deed of trust when in fact existing law invalidated only the acknowledgement. In Galloway, after overruling Tavenner, the court explained
the issue should be resolved by an analysis under the Uniform Notary

190. Galloway, 423 S.E.2d at 878 (citations omitted).
191. 130 S.E. at 666 (emphasis added).
192. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994) (providing: "The trustee [in bankruptcy] shall have, as
of the commencement of the case . . .the rights and powers of ... (3)a bona fide purchaser of real property . . . from the debtor . . . that obtains the status of a bona fide

purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the

case . ...).
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Act.193 Pursuant to the analysis, the court first determined that the notary had a disqualifying interest in the instrument because he was
named as trustee in the deed of trust which he "acknowledged." The
court continued:
Where the notary has a disqualifying interest, the next question is the
bearing this defect has on the validity of the instrument. We decline to

follow the per se rule of Tavenner and its progeny, which automatically
voids a deed of trust because the trustee has acted as its notary. Such a
rule can be unduly harsh, as illustrated by the facts of this case ....
If the primary purpose of the rule is to shield the parties from potential wrongdoing or fraud, then the focus of the inquiry should be shifted
in this direction." 4

The court then held that a notary's disqualifying interest can result
in voiding an instrument, and
[i]n deciding whether to void the instrument, a court should consider
whether an improper benefit was obtained by the notary or any party to
the instrument, as well as whether any harm flowed from the transaction.
To the extent that Tavenner and related cases state or imply the contrary,
they are overruled.'95

The court stated the burden of proof should be on the notary or any
party supporting the instrument to uphold its validity.'96 The court
concluded Galloway by stating that if the federal district court upheld
the bankruptcy court's decision, then the notary's negligent act of taking the acknowledgement of the deed of trust, in which he was named
as trustee, proximately caused Ms. Cinello to lose her status as a secured creditor.'97
The court in Galloway should have focused on whether it was
negligent for an attorney to take an acknowledgement of the deed of
trust in which he was named as trustee because it made the deed of
trust "unrecordable" and caused it to lose its priority under the bank-

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Chapter 29C of the West Virginia Code.
Galloway, 423 S.E.2d at 879.
Id. at 880.
Id.
Id.
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ruptcy law. Such a decision, would have been consistent with existing
law, and reached the same result set forth above. However, the court
opted to discuss Tavenner and its progeny apparently under a mistaken
opinion as to their holdings, for example, stating that the instrument
was invalid as opposed to the acknowledgement.'98
It is submitted that the issue the court needed to address in
Galloway was whether a notary who is named as trustee in a deed of
trust has a disqualifying interest under Section 29C-3-102. If the answer is "yes," then the acknowledgement is defective and the instrument is not recordable and the bankruptcy trustee has priority under
Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code. In such case, the attorney could
be held liable for negligence. If it is not a disqualifying interest, then
the acknowledgement is valid and the recorded deed of trust is recognized as a perfected security interest. Hopefully, the court will revisit
the issue and until then the title examiner should continue to assume,
notwithstanding the language in Galloway,99' that Tavenner represents
relevant law (that the instrument is valid between the parties but it is
not recordable so as to provide constructive notice).
V. NOTICE -

Do You KNow WHAT You "KNow"?

A. Actual Notice
Under the recording act, the "notice" that will deprive the purchaser of his or her protection may be of several types. Obviously "actual
notice" constitutes "notice" under the recording act."'0 Actual knowl-

198. This is succinctly illustrated by the following comment by the court:
While this section [(West Virginia Code Section 29C-3-102)] states that a notary
with a disqualifying interest "may not legally perform any notarial act in connection with the transaction," it does not address the validity of a document acknowledged before a notary with a disqualifying interest. No provision in the Act deals
with this question.
Id. at 879.
199. "To the extent that Tavenner v. Barrett,supra, and related cases state or imply the
contrary, they are overruled." 423 S.E.2d at 880.
200. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (6th ed. 1990) (Defining "actual notice" as follows:
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edge is "notice". For example, in Gullett v. Burton,2' the court held
that the discovery of a deed during the course of a title examination
constitutes actual notice on the part of a purchaser, so as to deny the
purchaser of the status of being a bona fide purchaser without notice
under the recording act. Similarly, the knowledge of an agent for the
purchaser is imputed to the principal. This concept of agency law is

illustrated by Syllabus Point 1 of George v. Stansbur202 as follows:
Where a subsequent purchaser for value obtains a deed for land
through an agent, and the agent, while negotiating therefore, is informed
that the land has already been sold and conveyed to another, such notice
to the agent is notice to his principal, and, though the subsequent
purchaser's deed be first recorded, it will not take priority over the deed
first made, and it may be cancelled and set aside by a court of equity in a
proper proceeding for that purpose.0 3

B. Inquiry Notice
Related to "actual notice" (subjectively known by the individual),
is "inquiry notice". One of the most significant discussions of inquiry
notice in the state is found in Pocahontas Tanning Co. v. St. Lawrence
Boom & Manufacturing Co.2"4 The law of that decision is succinctly
stated in Syllabus Points 1 through 4 as follows:

Actual notice has been defined as notice expressly and actually given, and brought
home to the party directly. The term "actual notice", however, is generally given a
wider meaning as embracing two classes, express and implied; the former includes
all knowledge of a degree above that which depends upon collateral inference, or
which imposes upon the party the further duty of inquiry; the latter imputes
knowledge to the party because he is shown to be conscious of having the means
of knowledge. In this sense, actual notice is such notice as is positively proved to
have been given to a party directly and personally, or such as he is presumed to
have received personally because the evidence within his knowledge was sufficient
to put him upon inquiry.).
201. 345 S.E.2d 323 (W. Va. 1986).
202. 111 S.E. 598 (W. Va. 1922).
203. Id. at 598, Syl. Pt. 1.
204. 60 S.E. 890 (W. Va. 1908).
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1. Whatever is sufficient to direct the attention of a purchaser to
prior rights and equities of third parties, so as to put him on inquiry into
ascertaining their nature, will operate as notice.
2. A party is not entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser,
without notice, unless he looks to every part of the title he is purchasing,
neglecting no source of information respecting it which common prudence
suggests.
3. That which fairly puts a party on inquiry is regarded as sufficient
notice, if the means of knowledge are at hand; and a purchaser, having
sufficient knowledge to put him on inquiry, or being informed of circumstances which ought to lead to such inquiry, is deemed to be sufficiently
notified to deprive him of the character of an innocent purchaser.
4. If one has knowledge or information of facts sufficient to put a
prudent man on inquiry, as to the existence of some right or title in conflict with that which he is about to purchase, he is bound to prosecute the
same, and to ascertain the extent of such prior right; and, if he wholly neglects to make inquiry, or, having begun it, fails to prosecute it in reasonable manner, the law will charge him with knowledge of all facts that
such inquiry would have afforded."'

205. Id. In addition to the language in the syllabi, the following excerpts from the
decision are instructive:
A purchaser is bound to take notice of all recitals in the deed through which the
title is derived, and is affected with notice of every matter or thing stated in the
several conveyances constituting his chain of title. All such statements and recitals
are sufficient to raise an inquiry, and the corresponding duty is thrust upon the
purchaser to investigate and fully explore everything to which his attention is thereby directed.
60 S.E. at 893 (quoting WARVELLE ON VENDORS § 263). The court also quoted from an
earlier decision, Cain v. Cox, 23 W. Va. 594 (1884), as follows: "'One is considered a
purchaser for valuable consideration with notice of another's equity whenever he has such
notice of such facts as would put him on inquiry, for the law imputes to a person knowledge of facts, of which the exercise of common prudence and ordinary diligence must have
apprised him."' 60 S.E. at 894. Finally, the court adopted the following rule:
Purchasers are bound to use a due degree of caution in making their purchases, or
they will not be entitled to protection. Caveat emptor is one of the best settled
maxims of the law, and applies exclusively to a purchaser. He must take care, and
make due inquiries, or he may not be a bona fide purchaser. He is bound not
only by actual, but also by constructive notice, which is the same in its effect as
actual notice. He must look to the title papers under which he buys, and is
charged with notice of all the facts appearing on their face, or to the knowledge
of which anything there appearing will conduct him. He has no right to shut his
eyes or his ears to the inlet of information, and then say he is a bona fide purchaser without notice.
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The principles of inquiry notice articulated in Pocahontas Tanning
Co. have been followed in a number of subsequent cases including the
more recent ones of Gullett v. Burton; °6 Eagle Gas Co. v. Doran &
Associates, Inc.;27 and Highway Properties v. Dollar Savings
20 8

Bank.

C. Duty to Take a View
Related to "inquiry notice" is the duty to take a view. This wellestablished principle of law is expressed in Bailey v. Banther °9 as

follows:
A purchaser of real estate, contracting with a claimant not in possession, is put on inquiry by the fact that another is in possession of the
property; and if he takes a conveyance from such claimant, he is charged
in favor of the person so in possession with all the information such inquiry would have disclosed if diligently pursued ....
The defense of innocent purchaser is not available as a defense
against one in actual possession holding under a prior equitable title, from
the same vendor. The law imputes to such subsequent purchaser knowledge of all the rights which an inquiry of the purchaser in possession or
those holding under him might disclose.
The law imputes to a purchaser of real estate, or an interest in real
estate, all information which would be conveyed to him by an actual view
of the premises."'

A case which is helpful in understanding the recording acts, in-

cluding the duty to take a view, is Weekly v. Hardesty.21' Hardesty
owned 154 acres out of which she sold two parcels consisting of 18

Id. at 894 (emphasis added) (quoting Burwell's Adm'rs v. Fauber, 61 Va. (21 Gratt.) 446
(1871)).
206. 345 S.E.2d 323 (W. Va. 1986).
207. 387 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1989).
208. 431 S.E.2d 95 (W. Va. 1993).
209. 314 S.E.2d 176 (W. Va. 1983).
210. Id. at 181 (citation omitted). See also GuIlett v. Burton, 345 S.E.2d 323 (W. Va.
1986); Mills v. McLanahan, 73 S.E. 927 (W. Va. 1912); Smith v. Owens, 59 S.E. 762 (W.
Va. 1907).
211. 35 S.E. 880 (W. Va. 1900).
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acres and 53 acres to McCown.2" 2 McCown took possession of the
premises under her deed of April, 1893, but did not record her
deed.2" 3 Weekly subsequently purchased these parcels from
McCown." 4 However, rather than McCown giving Weekly a deed for
these parcels, Hardesty gave Weekly a deed for the property (dated
March 8, 1894) and allegedly McCown's unrecorded deed was destroyed.2"5 Weekly immediately took possession of the parcels, but
did not record his deed until April 5, 1894.216 On March 9, 1894,
Hardesty executed a deed of trust covering the entire 154 acres (including the parcels conveyed to Weekly the day before) to Brown.2"7
Brown's deed of trust was recorded on March 12, 1894, before
Weekly's deed was put of record.2" 8 On March 10, 1894, a judgment
in favor of Armstrong was docketed, thereby, creating a lien on
the deed of trust and judgHardesty's property. 9 Weekly challenged
220
title.
his
on
clouds
as
ment lien
Restated in chronological order, the facts are as follows: March 8,
1894, Hardesty conveys two parcels adverse of the 154-acre parcel to
Weekly and Weekly enters into possession; March 9, 1894, Hardesty
grants to Brown a deed of trust on all 154 acres; March 10, 1894,
Armstrong's judgment was docketed; March 12, 1894, Brown's deed of
trust was recorded; April 5, 1894, Weekley's deed was recorded. The
court, on appeal, upheld the judgment as a lien against the entire 154acre tract and directed the sale of the residue still owned by Mrs.
Hardesty to satisfy the Armstrong judgment. However, the court reversed the lower court's holding that the deed of trust was valid as to
the entire tract of 154 acres.22' The court explained that Weekly's
possession (the court said it did not matter whether Weekly or
McCown, as Weekly's "grantor," was in actual possession):
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
35
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 880.

S.E. at 880.
at 880.

at 882.
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[I]s notice to the world of the right of the party in possession, because
actual possession is just as much notice to purchasers as a recorded deed,
as shown at large in Ellison v. Torpin, where the authorities are collected.
If the Hardestys had made a deed to McCown, though it was not recorded, McCown's possession was notice to Brown of rights under it. Though
Weekly's deed was not recorded, his possession under McCown was notice
to Brown protecting Weekly's rights derived from McCown. But such
possession was not notice to the judgment creditor Armstrong, because he
is a creditor, whose right is paramount to that of any purchaser, whether
the creditor have notice of the purchase or not, unless the purchase is
recorded.2"
The same concept was followed in Page v. Westfield Pharmacy,
Inc.,223 where the court held that possession by a lessee was sufficient
"notice" to charge a purchaser of the property subject to a lease with
knowledge of the existence of an option to renew the lease. The court
reasoned that:
"A person in possession of real estate is sufficient notice to a purchaser,
contracting with a claimant of such real estate not in possession, to put
him on inquiry, and if he takes a conveyance from such claimant, he will
be charged in favor of the person so in possession with all the information
such inquiry would have given him if diligently pursued."
"The law not only imposes the duty upon a purchaser to make such
investigation, but imputes to him notice of all facts which such inquiry
would have disclosed, and of all the rights of those in possession, depriving him of the defense of an innocent purchaser."" 4
An important "exception" to the general rule that possession places
a purchaser on inquiry is found in Martin v. Thomas.22 5 Thomas
owned seven-tenths of 244 acres with the remaining three-tenths being
owned by the heirs of Corbin.226 These heirs conveyed their interests
to Brown, who, in turn, conveyed his interest to Martin. 227 Martin
brought suit to partition the acreage, which Thomas defended on the

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. (citation omitted).
128 S.E. 94 (W. Va. 1925).
Id. at 95 (citations omitted).
49 S.E. 118 (W. Va. 1904).
Id. at 119.
Id.
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basis that he owned all interest in the realty.228 Thomas claimed title
to the Corbin heirs' three-tenths under an unrecorded contract entered
into between himself and an agent of the heirs.229 While Thomas did
not assert that Martin had actual notice of the executory contract, he
did contend that he (Thomas) had entered into possession of the premises prior to the execution of the deed to Brown, Martin's grantor,
and that such possession should have placed Brown and Martin upon
notice of his rights under the contract. 230 The court stated,
[t]his raises the question whether when one of several coparceners is in
possession, and others not themselves in actual possession, and that one in
possession makes an executory contract to purchase the shares of those

others, such possession of that one is constructive notice to the world of
his purchase, so as to warn all persons from purchasing the shares of

those purchasers not in possession themselves."3

The court cited to authority for the premise that in order for possession to effect notice to a purchaser, "'the possession must be inconsistent with the apparent or record title of the grantor, else it will not
be sufficient to put upon the purchaser the duty of making further
inquiry; the reason being that in such case the possession is presumed
to be under the grantor's title.' 232 The court found that as a holder
of one-half of the interest in the premises on his own behalf, as well
as an heir of Corbin, and a purchaser of an interest of another heir of
Corbin, Thomas's possession was not inconsistent with the title of
record or that of the remaining non-possessory heirs of Corbin.233 As
a tenant in common (coparcener) with respect to the real estate,
Thomas's possession was insufficient to place a subsequent bona fide
purchaser of the remaining Corbin heirs' interests upon inquiry notice.
The court's holding is reflected in Syllabus Points 3 and 4. Syllabus
Point 3 states: "To make possession of land notice to subsequent purchasers, such possession must be inconsistent with the occupant's ap228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.

Id.
49 S.E. at 119.
Id. at 119-20 (quoting 23 THE AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 506

(2d ed. 1896)).
233. Id. at 120.
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parent or record title, because such possession will be presumed to be
'
under such title, rather than under another right."234
Syllabus Point 4
reads: "The mere sole possession of one coparcener or tenant in common is not notice to subsequent purchasers of shares of other
coparceners or tenants in common of the right of such occupant to
those shares under a prior unrecorded purchase of them by such occu' 235
pant."
D. Constructive Notice
Black's Law Dictionary defines constructive notice as:
Such notice as is implied or imputed by law, usually on the basis that the
information is a part of a public record or file, as in the case of notice of
documents which have been recorded in the appropriate registry of deeds
or probate. Notice with which a person is charged by reason of the notorious nature of the thing to be noticed, as contrasted with actual notice of
such thing. That which the law regards as sufficient to give notice and is
regarded as a substitute for actual notice. 6

In essence, "constructive notice" is that which the law treats one as
knowing, even though, as a subjective fact, one does not. Again, the
case of Pocahontas Tanning Co. v. St. Lawrence Boom Manufacturing
Co. 237 serves as a benchmark. Syllabus Point 2, quoted above, is expanded on by the court in its decision when it quotes an earlier Virginia case 238 as follows:
Purchasers are bound to use a due degree of caution in making their purchases, or they will not be entitled to protection. Caveat emptor is one of
the best settled maxims of the law, and applies exclusively to a purchaser.
He must take care, and make due inquiries, or he may not be a bona fide
purchaser. He is bound not only by actual, but also by constructive, notice, which is the same in its effect as actual notice. He must look to the
title papers under which he buys, and is charged with notice of all the
facts appearing on their face, or to the knowledge of which anything there

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.at 118, Syl. Pt 3.
Id. at 118, Syl. Pt. 4.
314 (6th ed. 1990).
60 S.E. 890 (W. Va. 1908).
Burwell's Adm'rs v. Fauber, 61 Va. (21 Gratt.) 446 (1871).
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
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appearing will conduct him. He has no right to shut his eyes or his ears
to the inlet of information, and then say he is a bona fide purchaser without notice. " 9

The law expressed in Pocahontas Tanning Co. has been followed in
numerous cases, including the recent decision in Highway Propertiesv.
Dollar Savings Bank,24° and is often expressed as a purchaser is
charged with notice of what appears in his or her chain of title.
Once a bona fide purchaser (BFP) acquires good title to property,
the BFP can transfer good title to a subsequent grantee even though
the subsequent grantee has notice, actual or constructive, of the prior
right.
For example, assume that 0 conveys to A and A does not record;
then 0 conveys to B, who is a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice of O's conveyance to A. In a notice jurisdiction, B prevails over
A. In order to "protect" B, B is able to convey good title to C, a
disinterested third party "even though C knows" of O's conveyance to
A. As the court in King v. Porter41 explained: "A purchaser with notice from a purchaser without notice is protected in his title. If it were
otherwise an innocent purchaser might be deprived of the benefit of
'
disposing of his estate."242
VI.

THE CHAIN OF TITLE -

ARE YOU MISSING ANY LINKS?

Given the fact that a purchaser is deemed to have constructive
notice of that which appears in his or her chain of title, it becomes
important to define "chain of title;" to clarify at what moment in time
an instrument is "recorded;" and what constitutes a recordable instrument. As discussed above, West Virginia Code Section 39-1-2 defines
the conditions under which the county clerk shall admit deeds, contracts, and other instruments to record. 243 To serve as constructive no239. Pocahontas Tanning Co., 60 S.E. at 894 (quoting Burwell's Adm'rs).

240. 431 S.E. 95 (W. Va. 1993). See also James v. Lawson, 136 S.E. 851 (W. Va.
1927); Smith v. Owens, 59 S.E. 762 (W.Va. 1907).
241. 71 S.E. 202 (W. Va. 1911).
242. Id. at 204. See also Colson, supra note 42, at 37; PATrON, supra note 41, § 15.
243. Note that the second paragraph of the statute specifically prohibits the clerk from
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tice the instrument must be "recordable." As the court in South Penn
Oil Co. V Blue Creek Development Co.,244 said:
It is established law that the copying into the records of an unrecordable
deed is not such a recordation thereof as will affect a subsequent bona
fide purchaser of the land thereby conveyed with notice.
The record does not operate as a constructive notice, unless the instrument
is duly executed, and properly acknowledged or proved, so as to entitle it
to be recorded.2"5

If an instrument is recordable, it is recorded and therefore becomes
constructive notice when it is given to the clerk for recordation. This
principal is set forth in Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin246 in Syllabus Point 5 as follows: "A recordable deed or deed of trust lodged in
the county clerk's office for recordation is constructive notice under
Code, 40-1-8, notwithstanding the misprision of the clerk in failing to
'
spread it upon the records of his office."247
Furthermore, the destruction of the record after it is recorded does not alter the fact that it
constitutes constructive notice. In Syllabus Point 3 of Wethered v.
248 the
Conrad,
court stated: "A grantee, who deposits his deed with
the clerk of the county court for recordation, is thereby protected under
the recording act. Even though the record may be thereafter destroyed,
it does not cease to be notice to those intended to be thereby affected. 24 9

admitting to record any instrument "that secures the payment of any debt, unless such . . .
instrument sets forth therein who, at the time of the execution and delivery thereof, is the
beneficial owner of the debt secured thereby, and where he resides .

. . ."

W. VA. CODE

§ 39-1-2 (1982). However, in Belknap v. Shock, 24 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1943), the court
held these requirements not applicable to acknowledgements pursuant to Section 39-1-3.
244. 88 S.E. 1029 (W. Va. 1916).
245. Id. at 1030 (citations omitted). See also Cox v. Wayt, 26 W. Va. 807 (1885);
Clarksburg Casket Co. v. Valley Undertaking Co., 94 S.E. 549 (W. Va. 1917); Thrig v.
Ihrig, 88 S.E. 1010 (V. Va. 1916).
246. 17 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1941).
247. Id. at 213, Syl. Pt 5.
248. 80 S.E. 953 (W. Va. 1914).
249. Id. at 953.
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A. Babble for the Ivory Tower or Sound and Prudent Advice?
Black's Law Dictionary defines a chain of title as a "[r]ecord of
successive conveyances, or other forms of alienation, affecting a particular parcel of land, arranged consecutively, from the government or
25 It is generally
original source of title down to the present holder.""
accepted by "title lawyers" that since the law imputes to them constructive notice of recorded conveyances by an "owner" between the
time an individual acquired title to property and the out-conveyance
which completes the link in the chain of title, they have a duty to
examine the records for "out-conveyances" between those two dates. In
other words, if A acquired title to Blackacre in 1970 and sold
Blackacre in 1980, the title examiner needs to determine what A did as
"owner" of Blackacre which could affect title thereto. Obviously, the
title examiner must be concerned with "conveyances" (deeds conveying
all or a portion of Blackacre, easements across Blackacre, security
interests given in Blackacre, and other similar deeds) which are contained in the grantor index under A's name between 1970 and 1980.
However, what about a deed made by A for Blackacre in 1960, before
she or he acquired title to Blackacre. The question is important because, as between the parties to the deed, West Virginia recognizes the
concept of estoppel by deed of warranty deeds. The concept of estoppel by deed is stated in Syllabus Point 5 of Johnston v. Terr' as
follows:
One who conveys real estate by a deed containing a covenant warranting
generally the title to the property conveyed, and who at the date of such
deed has no title, or a defective title thereto, is estopped from thereafter
asserting, as against his grantee, or his grantee's successor in title, any
title to such lands which he, the grantor, may acquire subsequent to the
date of said deed. 2

250. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 229 (6th ed. 1990).

251. 36 S.E.2d 489 (W. Va. 1945).
252. Id. at 490, Syl. Pt. 5. It should be noted that estoppel by deed applies only to
warranty deeds. In Egnor v. Roberts, 191 S.E. 532 (W. Va. 1937), the court made several
observations relevant to this discussion. The "deed" in Egnor contained no warranties, and as
to a deed without warranties, the court said:
A grant of land is a mere transfer of such title or right thereto as the grantor, at
the time of the grant, may hold or have, absolutely or contingently.
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While West Virginia recognizes the concept of estoppel by deed,
by statute (West Virginia Code Section 40-1-15), its application is, in
essence, limited to the parties to the warranty deed and the grantee's
successor in title. That is, estoppel by deed does not apply against
"purchasers" from the grantor. Section 40-1-15 reads:
seq.],
eight
by a
deed

A purchaser shall not, under this article, or articles one [§ 38-1-1 et
two [§ 38-2-1 et seq.] and eleven [§ 38-11-1 et seq.], chapter thirtyof this Code, be affected by the record of a deed or contract made
person under whom his title is not derived; nor by the record of a
or contract made by any person under whom the title of such pur-

chaser is derived, if it was made by such person, and was recorded, before
he acquired the legal title.'

The statute, therefore, resolves two separate questions of importance to
title attorneys. First, it provides that a purchaser is not on constructive
notice of recorded instruments in which the "grantor" is a "stranger" to
the chain of title. For example, if 0 is the owner of Blackacre, and X,
who is a "stranger" to the chain of title of Blackacre, "grants"
Blackacre to Z, and Z "records" the deed, a purchaser from 0 .""shall
not ...be affected by [that] deed ... .254

Certainly, a grant does not contain an assertion of title in the grantor, or
imply a covenant with the grantee, to warrant the land. .

.

.A conveyance without

warranty by
grantor had
grantee any
Egnor, 191 S.E.

mere estoppel cuts off the assertion of any title or claim which the
at the time of the conveyance, but it will not operate to pass to the
title afterwards acquired by the grantor.
at 534 (citations omitted).
253. W. VA. CODE § 40-1-15 (1982). In one of the early decisions applying this statute, Hoult v. Donahue, 21 W. Va. 294 (1883), the court explained the statute as follows:
This provision of the code was first introduced in the revision of 1849, and in a
note by the revisors it appears that the first part of the section was adopted to
carry into effect the views of Chancellor Kent in Murray v. Ballou, I Johns. Ch.
574, that a purchaser is not required to take notice of a record by a person under
whom his title is not derived. And the second part was framed to settle the doctrine of constructive notice affirmed by a divided court in Doswell v. Buchanan, 3
Leigh 365.
Hoult, 21 W. Va. at 299.
254. Hoult, 21 W. Va. at 299.
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Second, and as noted above, the statute also limits the application
of estoppel by deed to the parties to the deed, by restricting its application to purchasers from the grantor. For example, 0 is the owner of
Blackacre. While 0 is the owner, A executes and delivers to B a warranty deed to Blackacre which B records. Subsequent to the A to B
deed, 0 conveys Blackacre to A. Under estoppel by deed, the title A
acquired inures to the benefit of B under the A to B warranty deed. A
title examiner would be able to find the A to B deed indexed under
A's name in a grantor index ifthe title examiner looked under A's
name in the grantor index for the period of time preceding the date on
which A acquired title from 0. However, because of the provisions of
Section 40-1-15, a purchaser "shall not . . . be affected . . . by the
record of a deed or contract made by any person under whom the title
of such purchaser is derived, if it was made by such person, and was
'
recorded, before he acquired the legal title."255
In other words, the
purchaser is not held to have "constructive notice" of such a deed
because the effect of Section 40-1-15 is to make the A to B deed
outside of the chain of title. Therefore, with the "protection" afforded
by Section 40-1-15, the title examiner can begin checking or
"adversing" each owner in the grantor index beginning on the date that
person became the owner of legal title to the property.256
Obviously, the time period from when the individual acquired legal
title to the time that person conveyed title to the property is within the
"chain of title." The next question which arises is does a title examiner
have any duty to examine the records for the period of time after the
recording of a deed out of a grantor which apparently provides a link
in the chain of title. To illustrate, 0, the owner, conveys Blackacre,
which is vacant property, to A; A does not record. One year later, 0
conveys Blackacre to B who has knowledge of the 0 to A conveyance;
B records. One year later, A records. In a notice jurisdiction, such as
West Virginia, as between A and B, A's title prevails over B's because
B had notice of the 0 to A conveyance and B's recording before A's
recording gives no validity to B's deed. However, a title examiner

255. W. VA. CODE § 40-1-15 (1982).
256. It is not clear how the statute would apply to a situation when an individual
owned the property twice.
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looking under O's name in a grantor index, would find O's conveyance to B first. If the title examiner stopped looking under O's name

at that point in time, she or he would not discover the later recorded
0 to A deed, which in a notice jurisdiction provides superior title to
Blackacre (since B had notice of the 0 to A deed). Is the recorded

deed from 0 to A constructive notice to a person who is negotiating
with B for the :purchase of Blackacre? If the answer is yes, then B's
attorney must search in O's name in the grantor index past the recorded conveyance of 0 to B to find the 0 to A deed. This very question
was raised by Dean Clyde L. Colson in a 1954 law review article." 7
Dean Colson began his article with the following observation:
There is a serious question whether the limited search customarily
made by title examiners in West Virginia is a safe one, both with respect

to the interests of the prospective purchaser, and also with respect to the
possible liability of the examiner for having negligently failed to discover
recorded instruments which are or may be a cloud on title. Everyone is
agreed that there must be a search of the records from the date each
grantor in the chain of title acquired his title down to the date when it
appears that by an instrument of record he has transferred the title. The
difference of opinion centers around the question whether it is necessary to
carry on the search in the name of a grantor after he appears to have conveyed record title. In actual practice no such additional search is made and
the lawyers of the state seem to be of almost unanimous opinion that no
such search is necessary. An attempt will be made in this article to show
that the customary practice is not safe, at least so long as the question
remains undecided in West Virginia. In this connection we shall so far as
possible avoid discussions of what the law should be. We are more interested in trying to determine what the law is under our statues and decisions, and what risks a title examiner may be taking under the present
West Virginia practice, when he ignores certain questions which so far as
we have been able to discover are still unanswered in this state.
In the following pages, Dean Colson "reasoned" through examples

to establish that in a pure notice jurisdiction the first recorded deed
does not always prevail over the later recorded deed. After noting that

it is clear from the language in Cross v. Riddel

59

that West Virginia

257. Colson, supra note 42. In Dean Colson's article, he provides factual scenarios
which more fully illustrate and discuss the simplified example set forth above.
258. Id. at 20.
259. 177 S.E. 870 (W. Va. 1934). Dean Colson stated: "[a]s between two successive
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is a pure notice jurisdiction, Dean Colson stated that a construction of
statute which gives priority to the grantee of the first recorded deed
over the second recorded would turn our statute into a race-notice
statute."' In essence, Dean Colson noted that the holdings of our
court have established that West Virginia recording laws are "pure
notice" acts; that the application of "notice" principles to factual situations establishes that the first recorded deed does not necessarily take
priority over a later recorded deed; and since the court has not specifically addressed the question of whether a purchaser from the grantee
of a first-record deed is held to have constructive notice of the laterrecorded deed, the lawyer needs to search under each owner's name in
the grantors' index to the present.
Dean Colson concluded his article by stating:
[I]t seems too clear for argument that so long as it remains an open ques-

tion whether such a recorded deed gives constructive notice, any lawyer
who fails to bring down to date the search under the name of each grantor, which is the only way C's [(in the above example A's)] deed can be
discovered, is taking a chance which in fairness to his client he ought not
to take.
That consideration alone should settle the matter, but the lawyer
should also weigh the possibility that he may come under personal liability
to his client for failure to make a reasonably careful and diligent search of
the record. It is too clear for argument that a diligent search would bring
C's [(A's)] deed to light. It is no answer to say that this situation will
arise so infrequently as to justify the lawyer in taking this calculated risk.
Though willing to assume the personal risk involved, loyalty to the interests of his client should preclude any such gamble. Unless and until our
court or the legislature makes it clear that there is no necessity for making
a broader search than is ordinarily made by the practicing lawyer, Patton's
advice, when he was discussing the first problem posed above, is eminently sound:
"... is a purchaser from C on notice of any rights B may have as
against C? Though some courts hold that he is thus placed upon inquiry
and charged with notice of any facts which the inquiry would reveal, other
courts hold that a purchaser is under no obligation to search the records
grantees from the same grantor, it is abundantly clear from the West Virginia cases that
priority depends not upon priority of recording but solely upon whether the second grantee
at the time he became a purchaser had actual or constructive notice of the prior conveyance." Colson, supra note 42, at 24.
260. Colson, supra note 42, at 38.
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for conveyances from any particular grantor recorded subsequent to that
from which the purchaser's vendor deraigns title; that any such subsequently recorded conveyance is outside the chain of title and does not
afford constructive notice. In states having no decision on the subject, the
only safe course for an examiner is to treat as a cloud on the title any
conflicting deed dated prior to, but recorded after, a deed from the same
grantor appearing in the vendor's chain of title." '6'

It has been more than forty years since Dean Colson's article
appeared in the West Virginia Law Review. A new generation of lawyers has entered practice; thousands of titles have been examined and
title opinions rendered.
Patton on Titles is now in its second edition, and the case necessary to decide the issue raised by Dean Colson has still not been decided in West Virginia.2 62 However, the logical application of a notice recording act to such facts remains uncontested, the soundness of
Dean Colson's reasoning remains unchallenged, and the wisdom of his
advice remains unchanged.263

261. Colson, supra note 42, at 38 (quoting PATrON, supra note 41, § 46, at 197-98).
262. While the particular question has not been answered in West Virginia, there is
some precedent holding a grantee has constructive notice of the subsequent recording of a
prior deed. In Alexander v. Andrews, 64 S.E.2d 487 (W. Va. 1951), the court held that the
"subsequent purchaser" (i.e., the grantor's son) who recorded first, had constructive notice of
the "prior deed" (i.e., the deed to his sister, which was earlier in time but not recorded
when he "purchased" his father's interest in the property) as of the date it (his sister's deed)
was recorded. In other words, the subsequent "purchase?' without notice who recorded first,
but who had not paid the entire purchase price was held to have constructive notice of the
recording of the first in time deed so as to deprive the "subsequent purchaser" of the status
of being a "full" purchaser.
263. See PATrON, supra note 41, § 71, at 235-37 (Reading as follows:
§71 Effect as Notice of the Subsequent Record of an Earlier Deed by the
Vendor's Grantor
A further phase of the question is as to whether the record of an
earlier deed from a common grantor after the record of a deed upon
which a vendor's title is based places a purchaser upon inquiry as to
whether the later grantee purchased with knowledge of the earlier conveyance. To illustrate: A deeds to B, who does not record the deed;
later A deeds to C who does record his deed; thereafter the deed of A
to B is recorded; is a purchaser from C on notice of any rights B may
have as against C? Though some courts hold that he is thus placed upon
inquiry and charged with notice of any facts which the inquiry would
reveal, other courts hold that a purchaser is under no obligation to
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B. Deeds From Common Grantors -

More Babble or Good Advice?

Assume that 0 is the owner of Blackacre, a tract containing 100
acres, and 0 sells 20 acres of Blackacre to A and in the deed to A
makes a covenant with A which restricts the use of the rest of O's
remaining 80 Acres of Blackacre (or grants an easement over the remaining 80 acres). Assume 0 sells another 20 acres of Blackacre to B
and also makes a covenant with B which restricts the use of the remaining 60 acres of Blackacre; similar conveyances are made to C and
D. 0 then sells the remaining 20 acres of Blackacre to E and the deed
to E makes no mention of the restriction (or easement) encumbering
Blackacre created by the covenants in the conveyances to A, B, C and
D. Obviously, E must be concerned with the previous out-conveyances
from 0 as they relate to description. E must assure there are no overlaps in description with the parcel conveyed to E, and that the sum of
the parts does not exceed the whole. Is E also charged with constructive notice of the contents of the deeds out from 0 so as to be bound
by the restrictive covenants (or easements) therein; thus, affecting the
use of Blackacre? This question is sometimes phrased as whether the
deeds out from a common grantor are within E's chain of title?
While there are at least two West Virginia cases which have apparently raised this issue, there does not appear to be a definitive answer to the question. The first case to apparently delve into the issue
is Cole v. Seamonds.2" A simplified statement of the facts is that
Browning, the owner of the surface, conveyed to Cole and Crane 156
acres less 2 acres which Browning reserved." 5 Cole and Crane were
the owners of the minerals underlying the 156 acres and in exchange
for the 154 acres of surface, Cole and Crane released the two acres
search the records for conveyances from any particular grantor recorded
subsequent to that from which the purchaser's vendor deraigns title; that
any such subsequently recorded conveyance is outside the chain of title
and does not afford constructive notice. In states having no decision on
the subject, the only safe course for an examiner is to treat as a cloud
on the title any conflicting deed dated prior to, but recorded after, a
deed from the same grantor appearing in the vendor's chain of title.).
264. 104 S.E. 747 (W. Va. 1920).
265. Id. at 747.
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reserved by Browning from the operation of any rights for mining
purposes. 6 In consideration for the release of mining rights,
Browning covenanted to use the surface of the 2 acres for residence
and agricultural purposes only,
"and covenant and agree for themselves, their executors, administrators,
and assigns, not to conduct or suffer to be conducted on said 2 acres of
surface any mercantile business, and that no intoxicating drinks of any
character are to be sold or kept
thereon; and this covenant shall run with
2 67
said 2 acres of surface land.
Approximately two years later, the Brownings conveyed one-sixth of
an acre of the two acres to Seamonds, their daughter, without any
reservation, exception, or limitation except that she should not sell and
convey the parcel without their consent.268 Seamonds contended that
she did not have actual knowledge of the restriction contained in the
deed from Browning to Cole and Crane (the deed in which Browning
conveyed 154 of the 156 acres, reserving the 2 acres of the
surface).269 Subsequently, Seamonds rented a building on the onesixth acre to M.A. Hindy who operated a general mercantile store and
another building to Nick Gemerous, who used it to sell hot dogs and
soft dinks. ° Cole and Crane sought an injunction alleging these activities to be in violation of the restrictions contained in the deed from
Browning to them.271 For reasons that can perhaps be best summarized as involving the relationship between coal companies and their
employees in the earlier part of this century, the court held the covenant to be a personal covenant between the original grantor and grantee. For present purposes, Syllabus Point 4 is relevant and states:
Actual notice of such restrictive covenants is not essential. Such constructive notice as is afforded 27by
a duly recorded instrument in the vendee's
2
chain of title is sufficient.

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id.
Id. at 747-48 (quoting from subject deed).
Id. at 748.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 747, Syl. Pt. 4.
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Syllabus Point 4 is supported by the following language within the
decision: "And the authorities are uniform in holding that actual notice
of the restriction is not essential, but that constructive notice is sufficient."273 In addition, the court noted that while such equitable
servitudes are most frequently imposed on the land conveyed to the
grantee, "the principle is the same where the grantor covenants to restrict the use of land retained by him for the benefit of the land conveyed to his grantee. 274 Thus, the court in Cole recognized that the
retained land can be subject to restrictions placed upon its use by conveyances to a grantee and that "actual notice" of the restriction is not
necessary. Unfortunately, the court did not define "chain of title" as
used in Syllabus Point 4. However, the discussion in Cole seems to
suggest that a subsequent grantee would have constructive notice of the
deed out from the common grantor. 75
The second case which could possibly shed some light on the
issue is McIntosh v. Vail276 Again, the case is disposed of by holding
that the covenant involved was a personal covenant. The provision in
question involved production of oil and gas and the payment of "one
full sixteenth (1/16) of the oil and gas produced and marketed from
'
said lands."277
However, within the decision, the court stated, "We
have heretofore noted that the covenant burdened the estate reserved,
and it is well to note also that this court, adhering to the English or
minority rule in this country, is committed to the doctrine that, except
as between landlord and tenant, no burden can be imposed on land by
a grantor's covenant so as to bind a subsequent grantee of the
covenantor.""27 The case cited by the court for this proposition279
had also been resolved on the basis that the covenant was personal as
273. Id. at 750.

274. Id.
275. "0" conveyed 156 acres of surface to Browning; Browning conveyed 154 acres-of
surface to Cole and Crane and in this deed Browning covenanted as to the use of the remaining 2 acres (the deed out from the common grantor); Browning conveys 1/6 of an acre
of the remaining two acres to Seamond, the subsequent grantee. 104 S.E. at 748.
276. 28 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1943).
277. Id. at 608.
278. Id. at 613.
279. West Virginia Transp. Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600 (1883).
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opposed to a covenant real running with the land. In addition, the
court in McIntosh did not cite or discuss its earlier decision in Cole
which was inconsistent with its discussions in the case it was deciding.
Therefore, the dictum in West Virginia provides no meaningful guidance for title lawyers.
On a national level, there exists a split of authority on this issue.
Cases from the various states have been collected and discussed in an
American Law Reports (A.L.R.) annotation in which the author of the
annotation states:
The weight of authority is to the effect that if a deed or a contract
for the conveyance of one parcel of land, with a covenant or easement affecting another parcel of land owned by the same grantor, is duly recorded, the record is constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser of the latter
parcel. The rule is based generally upon the principle that a grantee is
chargeable with notice of everything affecting his title which could be
discovered by an examination 2of
the records of the deeds or other
80
muniments of title of his grantor.

As noted above, the dictum in the Cole decision appears consistent
with the majority position. However, in McIntosh, the court in dictum
said it followed the minority position which is discussed in the A.L.R.
annotation as follows: "Minority rule. There is authority, however, for
the view that the record of a deed is not constructive notice of a covenant or restriction therein, to a subsequent purchaser from the same
grantor of another parcel of land which is affected by the covenant or
281
restriction.
Given the uncertainty as to the law on this issue, the advice of
Dean Colson regarding the duty to check each grantor forward to the
present would also seem applicable here - that is, until this issue is
resolved in West Virginia, the prudent course for title attorneys in
West Virginia is to assume that purchasers will be held to have con-

280. Annotation, Record of deed or contract for conveyance of one parcel with covenant or easement affecting another parcel owned by grantor as constructive notice to subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer of latter parcel, 16 A.L.R. 1013 (1922). See also 20 AM.
JTR. 2D Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 304 (1995).
281. 16 A.L.R. at 1015.
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structive notice of such conveyances.2" ' Assuming the purchaser is
deemed to have constructive notice of such out-conveyances, the title
examiner would need to check each out-conveyance from common

grantors for covenants, easements, or any other language which could
affect the retained land of the grantor. Since, in many titles the out
conveyance from common grantors must be checked for description
purposes, the additional "work" is not .as great as it may first appear.
VII.

DOES TIE CURE ALL LIENS AGAINST TITLE?

A. Deeds of Trust and Mortgages
After the chain of title has been established, the title examiner
must check individuals or entities which owned the property for conveyances which may affect the quality or quantity of title. The period
of time which needs to be checked for each owner has been discussed
above. Also keep in mind that while deeds of trust or mortgages are
indexed and spread on the record in most counties in indices and
books separate and apart from "deeds," under the recording acts, the
secured parties under deeds of trust or mortgages are considered "purchasers" and not "creditors." It is also important to keep in mind that
the statute of limitation on vendor's liens, deeds of trust, and mortgages which was first adopted in 1921,283 has been held not to apply ret282. Colson, supra note 42, at 38.
283. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-5 (1994) (Providing:
No lien reserved on the face of any conveyance of real estate, or lien created
by any trust deed or mortgage on real estate, shall be valid or binding as a lien
on such real estate, after the expiration of twenty years from the date on which
the debt or obligation secured thereby becomes due, unless suit to enforce the
same shall have been instituted prior to the expiration of such period. If any debt
or obligation incurred or maturing subsequent to the debt or obligation secured by
a lien reserved on the face of any conveyance of real estate, or lien created by
any trust deed or mortgage on real estate, be also secured, in whole or in part, by
the same lien, such lien shall continue to be valid and binding as a lien on such
real estate for a period of twenty years from the date on which such subsequent
debt or obligation secured by such lien becomes due, but not thereafter unless suit
to enforce the same shall have been instituted prior to the expiration of such period. No extension of the original time of payment of such debt or obligation, or
renewal of any note or other evidence of indebtedness secured by such lien, or
provision for such extension or renewal in such conveyance, trust deed or mort-
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roactively in spite of the statute's express language. In Le Sage v.
Switzer,284 the court was asked to apply this twenty-year statute of

limitation to a deed of trust which had been given in 1909. In refusing
to bar a sale under the deed of trust, the court explained the parties
had agreed to the proposal to borrow the money under the law as it
existed in 1909 and the creditor was entitled to have the contract enforced according to that law.285 The court stated, "A subsequent law,
such as that of 1921, limiting the life of a deed of trust, would patently change (impair) the terms of the deed of trust herein, and therefore
would violate the Constitution [of the United States]."' 8" Perhaps the
most helpful discussion of the statute is found in McClintic v. Dunbar
Land Co.287 McClintic involved a vendor's lien reserved in a conveyance dated November 26, 1919, to pay six notes payable in one, two,
three, four and five years.288 In McClintic, the court noted that in
contrast to a procedural ban typical of statute of limitations, Section
55-2-5
went farther than merely to create a procedural limitation. Each made the
lien invalid. That must mean invalid for all purposes. An ordinary statute
of limitation must be pleaded by the party against whom the claim is

gage, shall operate to extend the limitation of twenty years hereinbefore provided:
Provided, that the lien reserved or created as aforesaid shall continue to be valid
and be enforceable, itprior to the expiration of the original period of limitations,
the vendor or the mortgagee or the trustee or beneficiary, or their successors or
assigns, shall execute and cause to be recorded in the office where the lien instrument was recorded an affidavit setting forth the unpaid balance of the debt and
interest secured by such lien instrument. Upon the filing of such affidavit the lien
of the lien instrument shall continue and be enforceable for an additional period of
twenty years from the date of the filing of such affidavit unless sooner released,
and the clerk of the court shall cause the extension affidavit to be recorded and
indexed in the same manner as the lien instrument and shall note the fact of filing
such extension affidavit on the margin of the page where such lien instrument is
recorded. Such affidavit shall recite the book and page of recordation of the deed,
deed of trust or mortgage. The provisions of this section shall apply, with like
effect, to every such lien now existing, as well as to every such lien hereafter
reserved or created.).
284. 182 S.E. 797 (W. Va. 1935).
285. Id. at 800.

286. Id.at 798-99.
287. 33 S.E.2d 593 (W. Va. 1945).
288. Id. at 593.
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urged, otherwise it will be ignored. But a lien expressly made invalid by
the Legislature has no force or effect whatever, and can never be made
the basis of a decree or judgment. Under ordinary statutes of limitations,
suits or actions on notes representing the money secured by a lien are at
the option of the maker of the note barred at the end of the period
named, leaving only the lien reserved on the face of the deed to secure
the notes. When that lien is declared invalid, nothing of value is left. The
original right is absolutely destroyed. For this reason, we think the Act of
1921, and the subsequent Code provision, amounted to more than a procedural statute of limitation, and in so far as they operate retroactively are
unconstitutional and void.8 9

It is important to note that Section 55-2-5 applies to the lien created
by the security instrument (vendor's liens,2 90 trust deeds, or mortgages
on real estate). The obligation to pay is based on the note, the personal
obligation of the maker; the security interest is to provide the land as
the collateral to assure the payment of the note. The note, as a separate legal instrument, has a distinct and separate statute of limitations
from that found in Section 55-2-5. If a note meets the requirements of
a negotiable instrument,2 9' the statute of limitation is six years. 2 9 2 If
the "note" fails to meet the requirements of a negotiable instrument
and is, therefore, considered to be a "contract" between the parties, the
10 year statute of limitation set forth in Section 55-2-6 would be applicable. Therefore, it is possible to have a case in which the statute of

289. Id. at 597. The holding is succinctly expressed in the case's sole Syllabus Point as
follows:
Chapter 65, Acts of the Legislature, 1921, as amended by Code, 55-2-5, is unconstitutional and void, so far as the same operates retroactively. The retroactive provision of the statute as it now exists operates to impair the obligations of contracts
in violation of Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States, and
Section 4 of Article M of the Constitution of this State.
Id. at 593 (syllabus of the court). See also Kuhn v. Shreeve, 89 S.E.2d 685 (W. Va. 1955).
290. See NV. VA. CODE § 38-1-1 (1985) (Providing:
If any person convey real estate, or any interest, legal or equitable, therein,
and the purchase money or any part thereof remain unpaid at the time of the conveyance, he shall not thereby have a lien for such unpaid purchase money unless
such lien is expressly reserved on the face of the conveyance. A vendor's lien may
be enforced by a suit in equity.).
291. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 46-3-101 to -805 (amended and reenacted in
1993).
292. W. VA. CODE § 46-3-118 (1993).
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limitation has expired on the note but has not "run" against the security instrument. In Morgan v. Farmington Coal & Coke Co.,293 the
court discussed whether the fact that the statute of limitation had expired on the "notes" would bar a suit to enforce the vendor's lien
which secured the notes. In Morgan, the notes had been assigned by
the original payee to the plaintiff. In holding that the suit on the
vendor's lien could proceed, the court said: "It is also well settled that
the right to enforce the lien thus assigned exists after the remedy at
' The
law for the collection of the debt has been lost by limitation."294
court further rejected the defendant's argument that any equities which
could have been asserted in a suit on the notes could be asserted
against the lien.295 Defendants argument was based on a South Carolina decision.296 In rejecting the reasoning of the South Carolina court,
the West Virginia court said:
We cannot see that the remedy on the lien would be changed in character
because the note itself could not be enforced. The loss of the remedy on
the note would not change the character of the debt or lien which secured

it. The theory by which the holder of the note after it is barred by limitation can proceed to enforce the lien securing it is that the creditor has two

remedies and we cannot see that the loss of one remedy would change the
other and make it less effective.297

In the event there is more than one deed of trust (mortgage) or
lien on the property and a foreclosure occurs, it is important to remember that the purchaser in the "foreclosure" obtains a title that is
free and clear of all mortgages or other liens junior or subordinate to
the mortgage being foreclosed. The corollary of this principle is that
the purchaser at a foreclosure of. a junior mortgage takes subject to the
rights of more senior mortgages or liens. In other words, a foreclosure
sale puts the purchaser at that sale in the shoes of the "mortgagor" as
of the time the mortgage being foreclosed was executed.29 The fact
293. 124 S.E. 591 (W. Va. 1924).
294. Id. at 597.
295. Id.

296. Dearman v. Trimmier, 2 S.E. 501 (S.C. 1887).
297. Morgan, 124. S.E. at 597. Since a deficiency judgment is brought on the note,
there could not be a deficiency judgment if proceeds of the sale under the security instrument do not satisfy the "debt."
298. GRANT S. NELsON & DALE A. WHiTMAN, REAL EsTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.1, at
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that a purchaser at a foreclosure under a second priority deed of trust
steps into the shoes of the "mortgagor" at the time the deed of trust
was executed, is illustrated by the recent decision in Young v.
Sodaro.299 In Young, the purchaser of property foreclosed under a
second deed of trust sought to pay off the note of the first deed of
trust holder."0 There was no prepayment provision in the note secured by the first deed of trust and the holder refused payment."0
The note provided for interest at 14% per annum?0 2 The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that, absent prepayment provisions in the note, the debtor, absent statutory authority or contractual
rights, has no right to prepay the promissory note secured by the deed
of trust.0 3
B. Liens Other Than Consensual CollateralSecurity Interests
In addition to the matters set forth above with respect to that
which a purchaser is "deemed to know" because of information in his
or her chain of title, there are a number of liens which can attach to
real property and affect the quality of title. Therefore, in order to perform a thorough title search, the title examiner must determine whether
any such liens exist. While there are various aspects of these liens
which are important, the only issue pertaining to such liens which will
be considered in this Article is the period of time a title lawyer must
examine the appropriate records in order to determine whether a valid
lien exists. While it is recognized that many clerks now maintain general lien indices, and that such indices make this aspect of title work
more efficient, for the purposes of discussion, and to illustrate the
period of time a title lawyer would need to examine the relevant index
as a part of the search, each lien will be treated as if it were indexed
separately.

1-5 (3d
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

ed. 1994).
456 S.E.2d 31 (W. Va. 1995).
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 35.
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1. Judgments
Under statutory law,
[e]very judgment for money rendered in this State . . . shall be a lien on
all the real estate of or to which the defendant in such judgment is or
becomes possessed or entitled, at or after the date of such judgment ....
Such lien shall continue so long as such judgment remains valid and enforceable, and has not been released or otherwise discharged." 4

While the lien created by Section 38-3-6 is effective as of the date of
judgment, it is not valid against a purchaser for valuable consideration
without notice or other lien creditors until it is "docketed" pursuant to
Section 38-3-5, and, unless the judgment is "extended" by writ of
execution, the judgment lien is subject to a ten year statute of limita30 5

tion.

Since a judgment attaches to after-acquired property, the period
before an individual acquires title to real property is relevant, and since
the lien is valid for ten years, any individual who has owned the property within ten years of the present date must be checked in the judgment docket.30 6 Obviously, if an individual conveyed the real estate

W. VA. CODE § 38-3-6 (1985).
305. See W. VA. CODE § 38-3-7 (1985) (Providing:
No judgment shall be a lien as against a purchaser of real estate for valuable
consideration without notice, unless it be docketed according to the fifth section
[(§ 38-3-5)] of this article, in the county wherein such real estate is, before a deed
therefor to such purchaser is delivered for record to the clerk of the county court
[county commission] of such county; nor shall such judgment, though it be docketed as aforesaid, be a lien, after ten years from its date as against such a purchaser
who purchases after such ten years, unless within such ten years an execution shall
have issued on such judgment and such execution or a copy thereof be filed in the
office of such clerk, or, unless such purchaser have actual notice of the fact that
such execution was issued, though it was not so filed; nor shall such judgment,
though it be docketed as aforesaid, and though one or more executions shall have
issued thereon and shall have been filed as aforesaid, be a lien, after ten years
from the date of the last execution so filed, as against such a purchaser who purchases after such ten years, unless such purchaser have notice of the issuing of an
execution within ten years preceding the date of such purchase.).
306. See W. VA. CODE § 38-3-5 (1985) (emphasis added).
304.
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before the judgment is entered against him or her, such judgment
would not attach to the conveyed property.
2.

Executions

For present purposes, the writ of execution is relevant for two
reasons. First, if the judgment creditor wishes to file a judgment creditor suit immediately (i.e., within two years) after obtaining the judgment, the issuance of the writ of execution is a prerequisite to such a
suit.307 If more than two years has passed since the entry of judgment, then the issuance and return of the execution is not required."'
In Jarvis v. Porterfield,"9 the court explained these alternatives
as follows:
In a number of cases this Court has examined the wording of this
statute. It has concluded that it creates two categories of creditors suits.
The first category is composed of those suits conducted within two years
after the date of the judgment giving rise to the creditor's lien. The second category consists of those suits conducted more than two years after
the date of the judgment giving rise to the judgment lien.
The Court has uniformly indicated that in the first category of suits,
those conducted less than two years after the date of the judgment giving
rise to the judgment lien, the issuance and return of an execution (a fieri
facias) is a condition precedent to a circuit court's obtaining jurisdiction to
enforce the judgment lien ....
The purpose of this rule is to require the judgment creditor first to
make a bona fide effort to obtain satisfaction of his debt by proceeding
legally against the judgment debtor's personalty before allowing him to

307. W. VA. CODE § 38-3-9 (1985).
308. See W. VA. CODE § 38-3-9 (1985) (Providing:
The lien of a judgment may be enforced in a court of equity after an execution of fieri facias thereon has been duly returned to the office of the court or to
the justice [magistrate] from which it issued showing by the return thereon that no
property could be found from which such execution could be made: Provided, that
such lien may be enforced in equity without such return when an execution or
fieri facias has not issued within two years from the date of the judgment If it
appears to such court that the rents and profits of the real estate subject to the
lien will not satisfy the judgment in five years, the court may decree such real
estate, or any part thereof, to be sold and the proceeds applied to the discharge of
the judgment).
309. 370 S.E.2d 620 (W. Va. 1988).
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resort to the more drastic equitable remedy of forcing the sale of the judgment debtor's real estate. It is also intended to provide a mechanism to
notify the judgment debtor within two years after entry of the judgment
that his land will be sold unless he satisfies the judgment."'
The second purpose of the writ of execution is to "extend" or

"keep alive" a judgment.3" As noted above, a judgment is valid for
ten years from its date, but it can be "renewed" if "within such ten
years an execution shall have issued on such judgment and such execution or a copy thereof be filed in the office of such clerk."3 '2 Successive executions to perpetuate a judgment's lien are possible subject to
the limitations set forth in Section 38-3-18, which reads as follows:
On a judgment, execution may be issued within ten years after the
date thereof. Where execution issues within ten years as aforesaid, other
executions may be issued on such judgment within ten years from the
return day of the last execution issued thereon, on which there is no return by an officer or which has been returned unsatisfied. An action, suit
or scire facias may be brought upon a judgment where there has been a
change of parties by death or otherwise at any time within ten years next
after the date of the judgment; or within ten years from the return day of
the last execution issued thereon on which there is no return by an officer
or which has been returned unsatisfied. But if such action, suit or scire
facias be against the personal representative of a decedent, it shall be
brought within five years from the qualification of such representative."'
Therefore, under the applicable law, judgments obtained "years
ago" could still constitute a valid lien against the land via successive
executions within the ten-year periods. The title examiner will, therefore, need to check each individual entity whose name appears in the
chain of title in he index for the execution docket for the preceding
ten years. If an execution is not found within this ten-year period, the
right to renew it has expired. If an execution is discovered within the
ten years, then further investigation of the records will be necessary to
determine whether the judgment was against the owner of the tract
during a period of time in which it would become a lien against the

310. Id. at 620.
311. See W. VA. CODE § 38-3-7 (1985).
312. W. VA. CODE § 38-3-7 (1985).
313. W. VA. CODE, § 38-3-18 (1985).
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property, whether the judgment has since been paid or otherwise discharged, or whether some limitation contained in West Virginia Code
Section 38-3-18 is applicable.
Assuming the title examiner finds no judgment within the ten-year
period and no executions within the ten year period, the title examiner
can report that there are no valid judgment liens against the subject
property and that enforcement of any earlier judgment would be precluded by the applicable statute of limitation.
3.

Mechanics' Liens

The potential of mechanics' liens creates special problems for title
lawyers. 14 While "mechanics' liens" are frequently associated with
"new construction," the statutes apply to the erection, building, construction, alteration, removal or repair of "any building or other structure, or other improvement appurtenant to any building or other structure ... ,"' With the specific inclusion of architects, surveyors, engineers, and landscape architects, there is now the potential for a
mechanics' lien in virtually every title examination.
While the clerk of the county commission is charged with the
responsibility of maintaining a "Mechanic's Lien Record,"3 6 under
the law, the title lawyer cannot rely solely on this record and its index
to protect his or her client. Under the applicable law, a "grace" period
is provided between the completion of the work and the filing date. A
brief review of the statute will be helpful in understanding the title
lawyer's dilemma.
Under Section 38-2-17, the lien attaches as of the date the "work"
begins or the material is fumished3 17 and "shall have priority over
314. As used in this Article, the term "mechanics' lien" is intended to include the liens
described in Sections 38-2-1 to -39. W. VA. CODE §§ 38-2-1 to -39 (1985 & Supp. 1995).
The term also includes the materialmen's lien, the mechanics' or laborers' lien, as well as
the lien of architects, surveyors, engineers and landscape architects, which were specifically
addressed by a 1991 amendment to Article 2. W. VA. CODE § 38-2-6a (Supp. 1995).
315. W. VA. CODE § 38-2-1 (Supp. 1995). See also W. VA. CODE §§ 38-2-3 to -6
(1985 & Supp. 1995).
316. W. VA. CODE § 38-2-27 (1985).
317. The lien attaches to the land if the contract is with the owner of the property. See
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any other lien secured by a deed of trust or otherwise which is created
subsequent to such date."31 Once the lien attaches to the property
under Section 38-2-17, the lien can be perfected against subsequent
purchasers and is valid against subsequent deeds of trust and other
liens arising after that date. 9 Since the statutes specifically provide
that "[n]o payment by the owner to any contractor or subcontractor of

any part or all of the contract price

..

shall affect, impair or limit

the lien of the subcontractor, laborer, or materialman or furnisher of

machinery or other necessary material or equipment... ,20 proof of
payment of the contractor does not assure that mechanics' liens will
not be a problem.
While the lien attaches from when the first work on the land be" ' the "clock" does not start to run on the requirement to give
gins,32
notice until the last of the work is performed or material is provid322
ed.

Mahan v. Bitting, 137 S.E. 889 (W. Va. 1927).
318. W. VA. CODE § 38-2-17 (1985).
319. Thom v. Barringer, 81 S.E. 846 (W. Va. 1914) (Syllabus Points 2 through 5
succinctly state this aspect of the law:
2. A mechanic's lien attaches and dates from the time the first work is done
or the first materials are furnished under the contract giving rise to it
3. One purchasing premises on which buildings are in the process of erection
must make inquiry and take notice of any mechanic's lien right that has attached
prior to his purchase.
4. A conveyance of the property, or an incumbrance placed thereon after a
mechanic's lien attaches by a beginning of performance under the contract, does
not cut off or affect the right to the mechanic's lien for the whole, though a part
of the execution of the contract is before and a part after the time of the conveyance or incumbrance.
5. When a mechanic's lien arises and attaches by reason of the beginning of
performance under a contract with the owner, the lien is properly filed under Code
1906, ch. 75, sec. 2, though before the time the contract is completed and the lien
is filed the owner who made the contract has conveyed the property to another.).
320. IV. VA. CODE § 38-2-21 (1985).
321. NV. VA. CODE § 38-2-17 (1985).
322. See W. VA. CODE § 38-2-16 (1985) (Providing:
For the purposes of this article, all materials furnished, all work done, and all
services provided by any one person, firm or corporation, upon any one building
or the improvements appurtenant thereto, or upon the real property whereon the
same stands, or to which it may have been removed, shall be deemed and considered one contract whether or not all of such material was bought at one time, or
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In order to perfect a mechanics' lien, the mechanic or materialman
must comply with the statutory requirements. If the work or material is
provided by a subcontractor, or furnished or provided to a contractor
or subcontractor, then such person or entity must give notice to the
owner (or his authorized agent) within sixty days after the completion
of the work or the furnishing of materials.323 If the contract is with
the owner,324 or the materials are supplied "directly" to the owner, or the work is provided "directly" to the owner,326 the statute
does not require notice be given to the owner because the owner is
"aware" of those contractual obligations. 7
Notice of the "mechanics' lien" (whether the contract is with the
owner, contractor, or subcontractor) must be filed in the office of the
clerk of the county commission within ninety days after completing the
work or furnishing the materials or providing the services. 328 There
is, therefore, a period of ninety days from when the date on which the
last work or services were performed or materials were furnished in
which to file notices of the existence of the lien. Obviously, until the
notice is filed there is no record of this lien in the clerk's office. However, as explained above, the lien attached to the land when the "work
began" and is valid against subsequent deeds of trust or deeds of conveyance.329 Also, keep in mind that such liens are applicable to all
work or services to improve the real estate and are not restricted to
"new construction." The "final step" in perfecting the lien is the filing
of suit to enforce the lien authorized in the mechanics' lien statute.
Suit must be filed within six months of the filing of the notice of the
lien in the clerk's office.33 If the lien is established in the suit, the

under one general agreement or otherwise, and whether or not all of such work,
labor or services provided, was contracted for at one time or otherwise.).

323. See W. VA. CODE §§ 38-2-9, -11, -13 (1985).
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

W. VA. CODE § 38-2-1 (Supp. 1995).
W. VA. CODE § 38-2-3 (1985).
W. VA. CODE § 38-2-5 (Supp. 1995).
Biddle Concrete Co. v. McOlvin, 111 S.E. 843 (W. Va. 1922).
See W. VA. CODE §§ 38-2-8 to -13 (1985).
W. VA. CODE § 38-2-17 (1985).

330. See W. VA. CODE § 38-2-34 (1985) (Providing:
Unless a suit in chancery to enforce any lien authorized by this article is
commenced within six months after the person desiring to avail himself thereof
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court shall order a sale of the property on which the lien is established, and in addition, the court can give a personal decree in favor of
the creditors.33 ' While the title examiner must check the appropriate
index for notice of the "mechanics' lien," it is the ninety days between
the cessation of 'work, services, or the providing of materials and the
last day for filing of the notice of the lien in the clerk's office that
creates the challenge for title attorneys. Assuming the owner has not
availed himself or herself of the statutory protection,332 there are essentially three solutions as to how the purchaser can be protected.
First, the title lawyer can establish as a fact that there are no "potential" mechanic or materialman liens, that is, that there has been no
work, services, or materials provided relevant to the subject real estate
within the preceding ninety days. Second, if there has been work, services, or materials furnished within the preceding ninety days, the
attorney can determine that all of those who could possibly assert
mechanics' or materialmen's liens have in fact been paid in full or that
sufficient funds are escrowed to satisfy all potential claims. Third, the
attorney could obtain a waiver of lien from all of those who have the
right to assert such a lien. As part of the work in the record room, the
title examiner needs to check the index for mechanics' liens for the
current owner and prior owners for a sufficient period of time to assure that there are no perfected mechanics' liens. As noted above, a
law suit is necessary to "perfect" the mechanics' lien and normally the
filing of a lis pendens is necessary to provide constructive notice of a
pending law suit.333 However, under the lis pendens statute:
[Where] the lien, right or interest asserted is based upon a judgment, decree, claim, contract or other instrument which has been docketed or recorded according to law in the office of the clerk of the county [commis-

shall have filed his notice in the clerk's office, as herein before provided in this
article, such lien shall be discharged; but a suit commenced by any person having
such lien shall, for the purpose of preserving the same, inure to the benefit of all
other persons having a lien under this article on the same property, and such persons may intervene in such suit for the purpose of enforcing their liens, in the
same manner as in other chancery suits.).
331. W. VA. CODF. § 38-2-35 (1985).
332. See W. VA. CODE § 38-2-22 (1985), entitled "Limitation of owner's liability by
recordation of contract and bond of general contractor."
333. See W. VA. CODE § 55-11-2 (1994).
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sion] of the county wherein the real estate is situated, and has thus become a matter of public record, the failure to file the notice herein mentioned [lis pendens] shall not operate to defeat the enforcement of such
lien, right or interest in the real estate as against such pendente lite purchaser or encumbrancer. 34

In Rardin v. Rardin,335 a case which involved an unrecorded
judgment, the court explained the basis for the proviso in Section 5511-2 as follows:
Section 13, ch. 139, Code [the predecessor to section 55-11-2], limitig the scope of the common law rule of lis pendens in this state, requires
recordation of formal notice of the pendency of the suit only where the
proceeding is one to subject real estate to the payment of any debt or liability, and where no previous lien shall have been acquired thereon in
some one or more of the methods prescribed by law. In the absence of either or both of these requirements the statute does not apply, and the
common law rule, requiring no formal notice, governs.336

Since there is no statute of limitation on how long a lawsuit may
remain pending once it has been filed, there is no simple answer as to
how far back or how many "owners" one needs to check in the
mechanics' lien index. Obviously the current owner, and a sufficient
number of prior owners, would need to be checked to assure that the
record has been examined for a period that extends past the time period in which a pending law suit could have been filed to enforce the
mechanics' lien.337

334. W. VA. CODE § 55-11-2 (1994).
335. 102 S.E. 295 (W. Va. 1919).
336. Id. at 295, Syl. Pt. 4.
337. While there is no "statute of limitation" on how long a lawsuit may remain pending, there are provisions which allow pending lawsuits to be dismissed for failure to prosecute. See W. VA. R. CT. P. 41(b) (1994); W. VA. CODE § 56-8-9 (1994). See also W. VA.
CODE § 38-2-37 (1994) (explaining how an order can be obtained requiring the clerk to
execute a release when the lienholder refuses).
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Lis Pendens

The records affecting the title to real estate are maintained in the
office of the clerk of the county commission. However, there may be
occasion in which the outcome of a lawsuit which has been filed with
the clerk of an appropriate court can affect the title to real estate.
Therefore, a method of alerting a purchaser of land that there is a
pending lawsuit which may affect the title to the subject real estate is
needed. The lis pendens record is designed to bridge this informational
gap 8 The requirements of the lis pendens notice are set forth in
Section 55-11-2 as follows:
Whenever any person shall commence a suit, action, attachment, or
other proceeding, whether at law or in equity, to enforce any lien upon,
right to, or interest in designated real estate, the pendency of such suit,
action, attachment or other proceeding shall not operate a constructive
notice thereof to any pendente lite purchaser or encumbrancer of such real
estate for a valuable consideration and without notice, until such person
shall file for recordation with the clerk of the county [commission] of
each county where the real estate sought to be affected is situated, a memorandum or notice of the pendency of such suit, action, attachment or
other proceeding, stating the title of the cause, the court in which it is
pending, the names of all the parties to such proceeding, a description of
the real estate to be affected, the nature of the lien, right or interest
sought to be enforced against the same, and the name of the person whose
estate therein is intended to be affected: Provided, however, that where the
lien, right or interest asserted is based upon a judgment, decree, claim,
contract or other instrument which has been docketed or recorded according to law in the office of the clerk of the county [commission] of the
county wherein the real estate is situated, and has thus become a matter of
public record, the failure to file the notice herein mentioned shall not
operate to defeat the enforcement of such lien, right or interest in the real
estate as against such pendente lite purchaser or encumbrancer.
The clerk of every such county [commission] shall, without delay,
record such memorandum or notice in the "lis pendens record," note upon
the record the day and hour when such notice was filed for recordation,
and index the same in the names of the parties.339

338. See W. VA. CODE § 55-11-1 (1994) (Providing:
There shall be kept in the office of the clerk of the county [commission] of
each county of this State a book to be called the "is pendens record," which shall
be a public record.).
339. W. VA. CODE § 55-11-2 (1994). The lis pendens notice for eminent domain pro-
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If a party seeks a lien of attachment on real estate,340
"[t]he plaintiff shall have a lien upon any real estate of the defendant
levied upon under an attachment, from the time of the suing out of the
attachment, but such lien may be defeated by a sale of such real estate to
a purchaser for value without notice before the filing, by the plaintiff, of
a notice of lis pendens
under the provisions of article eleven chapter fifty' 3 41
five of this Code.

The constructive notice created by filing the lis pendens is valid for
ten years, and can be renewed and extended for an additional ten years
by filing, within the ten-year period, a notice which satisfies the requirements of Section 55-11-2.342

Therefore, a title examiner's task in examining the lis pendens
record would be similar to that discussed above under executions
(check each owner for the preceding ten-year period, because any lis
pendens filed before that time, and not extended, would no longer
constitute constructive notice). If the lis pendens has been "renewed,"
the filing necessary for the renewal must be within the preceding tenyear period.
5. Federal, State and Local Taxes (Excluding Real Estate Taxes)
Our code requires the clerk of the county commission to maintain
a federal tax lien docket and provides that such liens shall not be valid
as against any mortgagee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice
shall be filed.343
ceedings is found in Section 54-2-4a. W. VA. CODE § 54-2-4a (1994).
340. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 38-7-1 to -46 (1985 & Supp. 1995).
341.

W. VA. CODE

§ 38-7-19 (1985).

342. See W. VA. CODE § 55-11-3 (1994) (Providing:
Constructive notice of the pendency of a suit, action, attachment or other
proceeding, arising from the filing for recordation of a notice or memorandum in
accordance with the provisions of section two [§ 55-11-2] of this article, shall
continue to operate as constructive notice thereof to any pendente lite purchaser or
encumbrancer of the real estate affected, for a period of ten years next after the
date when such notice was filed for recordation. Where constructive notice arises
as aforesaid, that notice may be renewed or extended for additional ten-year periods by the filing for recordation, as provided in section two [(§ 55-11-2)] of this
article, a similar memorandum or notice of lis pendens within ten years from the
date of recordation of the last such memorandum or notice.).
343. See W. VA. CODE § 38-10-1 (1985) (Providing, in part:
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A similar provision exists for liens in favor of the State of West
Virginia, or any political subdivision thereof, or any municipality. 34
If the property is served by a public service district,345 Section
16-13A-9 provides, in part, that "[a]ll delinquent fees, notes and
charges of the district for either water facilities, sewer facilities or gas
facilities are liens on the premises served of equal dignity, rank and
priority with the lien on such premises of state, county, school and
'
municipal taxes."346
Because Section 16-13A-3 provides, in part that
"[f~rom and after the date of the adoption of the order creating any
public service district, it is a public corporation and political subdivision of the state, but without any power to levy or collect ad valorem

[N]otices of federal tax liens and certificates discharging such liens may be filed in
the office of the clerk of the county [commission] of one or more of the counties
of this State. The clerk of the county [commission] of every county of this State
shall keep in his office in a well-bound book a federal tax lien docket, in which
he shall, upon the filing in his office of any notice of a lien upon the property of
any person in favor of the United States for the amount of any tax, including any
interest, penalty, additional amount, or additions to such tax, together with any
costs that may accrue in addition thereto, record such notice without delay. He
shall index such notice in the name of the person against whom the lien is
claimed. No such tax shall be a valid lien as against any mortgagee, purchaser or
judgment creditor, until such notice shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the
county [commission] of the county or counties in which the property subject to
such lien is situated.).
See also W. VA. CODE §§ 38-IOA-1 to -5 (Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 38-IOD-1 (Supp.
1995).
344. See W. VA. CODE § 38-IOC-1 (1985) (Providing:
No lien in favor of the State of West Virginia, or any political subdivision
thereof or of any municipality therein, whether heretofore or hereafter accruing,
except the lien for taxes accruing under the provisions of article eight [(West Virginia Code Sections 11-8-1 to -33)] chapter eleven of the Code of West Virginia,
one thousand nine hundred thirty-one, shall be enforceable as against a purchaser
(including lien creditor) of real estate or personal property for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless docketed, as hereinafter provided, in the office of the
clerk of the county [commission] of the county wherein such real estate or personal property is, before a deed therefor to such purchaser is delivered for record to
the clerk of the county [commission] of such county. The term "purchaser" as used
herein shall be construed to creditors whose liens were acquired and perfected prior
to such docketing.)
345. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 16-13A-1 to -25 (1995 & Supp. 1995).
346. W. VA. CODE § 16-13A-3 (1995).
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taxes,"347 the above provision of Section 38-10C-1 would be applicable, and the public service lien would have to be docketed to be enforceable as against a purchaser of the real estate for valuable consideration, without notice.
These sections provide for "docketing" or "filing" of notice of
various governmental liens so as to provide constructive notice. Typically the statute of limitations are set forth for each such lien as part
3 48
of the "substantive" law of the lien.
VIII. RELEASES
Whenever a lien against real estate has been discharged, a release
of the lien should be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county
commission where the lien is recorded so that the records will reflect
the discharge of the obligation. 49 Form releases are provided in the
statutes. 5° Whenever a release is presented to the clerk of the county
commission, the statute provides:
The clerk ...

shall record and properly index all releases and as-

signments admitted to record in his office . . . in a well-bound book to be
kept exclusively for the purpose, and, when any such instrument is recorded, he shall note the fact on the margin of the record or docket of the
lien affected or discharged thereby, with a reference to the book and page
where such release or assignment is recorded.' 5 '

347. W. VA. CODE § 16-13A-9 (1995).
348. For example, under W. VA. CODE § 11-10-12(a) (1995), the various state taxes
identified in Section 11-10-3
shall be a lien upon the real and personal property of the taxpayer." Furthermore, "[tlhe lien created by this section shall continue until the liability for
the tax, additions to tax, penalties and interest is satisfied or upon the expiration of ten years from the date the tax, additions to tax, penalties and
interest are due and payable under section eight [(Section 11-10-8)] of this
article or the date the tax return is filed, whichever is later.
W. VA. CODE § 11-10-12(b) (1995).
349. W. VA. CODE § 38-12-1 (Supp. 1995).
350. W. VA. CODE § 38-12-4 (1985).
351. W. VA. CODE § 38-12-9 (1985). See W. VA. CODE § 38-12-12 (1985) (describing
how to note the satisfaction of an executor on a judgment).
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It is not uncommon for title examiners to rely upon the notation in
the margin of the record or docket provided for in Section 38-12-9 as
establishing the lien is properly released. However, since the task of
noting the release of the lien involves more than a purely ministerial
function on the part of the clerk, the title examiner should examine the
release itself as part of the title examination. For example, the attorney
should confirm that the release is a full release as opposed to a partial
or limited release,35 that the release is executed by the proper person
or if it is executed in a representative capacity, that it is by an official
with the authority to execute such releases,353 that it is properly acknowledged, and that it properly describes the lien released.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS

While the most common link in the chain of title is the deed, the
quasi-judicial proceeding involving the administration of an estate and
a variety of other judicial proceedings may also constitute links in the
chain of title. In each such situation, the question of whether the proceeding conformed and complied with the applicable law becomes the
concern of the title attorney. A detailed discussion of the various proceedings is beyond the scope of this Article, but the following should
help to illustrate the relevance of the substantive law of such proceedings to a title examination.
A. Estates
Among the matters of concern in the administration of an estate as
a link in a chain of title is to correctly identify the successor in title to
the property. Obviously, if the person dies testate, the provisions of the
will are important and whether the will is valid and properly executed

352. See W. VA. CODE § 38-12-5 (1985).
353. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 38-12-2, -3, -7 (1985).
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is of concern. 4 If the person dies intestate, then the relevant statutes
of descent are important. 5
In addition to the statutory changes of 1957, 1992, and 1993 in
the law of intestate succession,356 there have been a number of judicial decisions which have impacted this area of the law. In 1969, the
court adopted the concept of equitable adoption,3 a concept which
recognizes an "equitable" adoption where there has been no formal
adoption pursuant to statutory provisions." Even though the court
has not specifically dealt with the concept of equitable adoption in the
context of title examinations, it is a legal concept that the title examiner must be aware of and consider in determining the "heirs" of those
who die owning real property." 9 Also, the title attorney must keep in
mind that the court, in Adkins v. McEldowney,360 followed the United
States Supreme Court decision in Trimble v. Gordon,361 by holding
that "Code, 42-1-5 must be applied to permit illegitimate children to
'
In Williamson v. Gane,63
inherit from both father and mother."362

354. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 41-1-1 to -5-20 (1982 & Supp. 1995).
355. See W. VA. CODE §§ 42-1-1 to -10 (Supp. 1995).
356. See generally John W. Fisher, II & Scott A. Cumutte, Reforming the Law of Intestate Succession and Elective Shares: New Solutions to Age-Old Problems, 93 W. VA. L.
REV. 61 (1990); John W. Fisher, II, Statutory Reform Revisited: Toward a Comprehensive
Understanding of the New Law of Intestate Succession and Elective Share, 96 W. VA. L.
REV. 85 (1993).
357. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1969). See
also First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont v. Phillips, 344 S.E.2d 201 (W. Va. 1985); Kisamore v.
Coakley, 437 S.E.2d 585 (W. Va. 1993).
358. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 48-4-1 to -11 (1995).
359. See generally King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85 (W. Va. 1983), Syllabus Point 2 of
which holds:
An adoptive child's entitlements to inheritance under the laws of intestate
succession are governed by the statute on intestate succession in effect at the time
of the death of the ancestor from whom he might inherit and not by the laws of
intestate succession in effect at the time of his adoption.
See also Morgan v. Mayes, 296 S.E.2d 34 (W. Va. 1982); Transamerica Occidental Life Ins.
Co. v. Burke, 368 S.E.2d 301, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va. 1988) (construing a will, the court said
"[t]he term 'children' ordinarily does not include stepchildren, but it may include stepchildren when a contrary intent is found from additional language or circumstances").
360. 280 S.E.2d 231 (1981).
361. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
362. Adkins, 280 S.E.2d at 233.
363. 345 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1986).
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the majority of the court declared "Adkins v. McEldowney, is fully
retroactive where there has been no justifiable and detrimental reliance
upon the law invalidated therein; where the subject property has not
been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value; or where the estate
'
administration is subject to further resolution."364
As a practical matter, in most situations, the attorney examining
title must rely on the affidavit of heirs.365 However, if the executor
or administrator, or some other credible person, fails to provide accurate information, then the affidavit of heirs will not correctly reflect
the successors to the decedent's real property. As the above brief summary should illustrate, the "law's" definition of heirs may not be the
same as a lay person's understanding of "heirs," and typically it is a
lay person who responds to the questions necessary to complete the
affidavit of heirs.
In comparison to the problem that may exist in determining a
decedent's heirs, other aspects of the administration of the estate are
fairly straight forward. The attorney should ascertain that the subject
property was included in the appraisal of the decedent's estate.366
Since real estate of the decedent may be subject to the payment of his
or her debts,367 it is important that the estate has been properly administered so that those who may be creditors of the estate have been
provided the opportunity to submit their claims and have the validity
of the claim resolved.368
Since estate taxes constitute a lien against the decedents real estate,369 it is important to determine that any taxes due on the estate
have been paid or it has been determined that there are no taxes
due. 37" Finally, one problem which may exist in a testate situation is
364. Id. at 318 (citation omitted) (syllabus of the court).
365. See W. VA. CODE § 44-1-13 (1982).
366. W. VA. CODE § 44-1-14 (Supp. 1995).
367. W. VA. CODE § 44-8-3 (1982).
368. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 44-2-1 to -29 (1982 & Supp. 1995).
369. W. VA. CODE § 11-11-17(a) (1995).
370. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 11-11-1 to -42 (1995). Section 11-11-17(a) provides that the tax shall be a lien for ten years after the decedent's death and Section 11-1117(d) provides for the issuance of a release when the tax has been paid or it is determined
that there is no tax due. See W. VA. CODE § 11-1l-17a (1995) (respecting a nonresident
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where the "personal representative" sold the property but was not devised the property in the will. Since real property passes directly to the
devisee or heir upon the decedent's death, an executor does not have
title to the property to convey. A 1987 amendment to Section 44-8-1
has helped to alleviate this problem for wills which became effective
after June 12, 1987. 37'
B. Judicial Proceedings
There are also occasions in which judicial proceedings may constitute a link in the chain of title. Among the more common are partition,372 judgment creditors' suits, 3 and summary proceedings for
the sale or lease of a property interest owned by one under a disability
or legal incapacity.374 In such cases, the title attorney needs to determine that the proceeding comports with the requirement of the statutes.

decedent's real estate). See also W. VA. CODE § 11-11-18 (1995).
371. In 1987, the legislature added the last two paragraphs to Section 44-8-1. The statute, in its entirety, reads as follows:
Real estate devised to be sold shall, if no person other than the executor be
appointed for the purpose, be sold and conveyed by the executor, and the proceeds
of sale, or the rents and profits of any real estate which the executor is authorized
by the will to receive, shall be received by the executor who qualifies, or by his
successor. If none qualify, or the one qualifying shall die, resign, or be removed
before the trust is executed or completed, the administrator with the will annexed
shall sell or convey the lands so devised to be sold, and receive the proceeds of
sale, or the rents and profits aforesaid, as an executor might have done.
When any will heretofore or hereafter executed gives to the executor named
therein the power to sell the testator's real estate, which has not been theretofore
specifically devised therein, the executor may sell any such real estate unless otherwise provided in said will. If such will directs the sale of testator's real estate but
names no executor, or names an executor and the executor dies, resigns or becomes incapable of acting, and an administrator with the will annexed is appointed,
the administrator with the will annexed may sell such real estate as aforesaid.
Nothing in this section shall be deemed or construed so as to invalidate any
conveyance made prior to the effective date [(June 12, 1987)] of the amendments
thereto adopted by the Legislature as its regular session held in the year one thousand nine hundred eighty-seven.
W. VA. CODE 44-8-1 (1994).
372. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 37-4-1 to -8 (1985).
373. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 38-3-1 to -19 (1985).
374. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 37-1-1 to -17 (1985).
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In order to make this determination, the attorney usually examines the
original file in he office of the clerk of circuit court (or appropriate
clerk's office). Two inquires are common to all of these proceedings.
First, the examiner needs to be sure the court in which the action was
brought had jurisdiction over the proceedings. And second, that all
parties essential to the proceedings were properly before the court, that
is, that there was a valid service of process or consent to the jurisdiction of the court.
Similarly, if the link in the chain of title is a "foreclosure" pursuant to a deed of trust, compliance with, first, the provisions of the
statute,'75 including the appointment of a substitute trustee,'76 and
second, the trust instrument, is necessary.
C. Delinquent and Nonentered (Forfeited)Land
As title attorneys know, the "law" requires that the owner of real
property have "his land entered for taxation on the landbooks of the
appropriate county, have himself charged with the taxes due thereon,
and pay the same."377 Failure to fulfill these obligations can ultimately result in the "owners" losing title to the property by way of the
state's enforcement of these obligations. Therefore, an essential part of
a title examination is to assure that the subject property has been properly entered upon the landbooks to prevent "forfeiture," and that the
taxes have been paid to prevent delinquency. Robert Louis Shuman, a
member of the West Virginia University College of Law Class of
1996, served as my research assistant on this Article, and has written a
companion article which discusses the delinquent and nonentered land
statutes with respect to a title examination. In addition to being a
member of the West Virginia Law Review, Mr. Shuman has considerable experience "in the record room" under the supervision of his
grandfather, Robert L. Shuman, and his father, Stephen K. Shuman,

375. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 38-1-1 to -14 (1985 & Supp. 1995).
376. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 44-14-1 to -5 (Supp. 1995).
377. W. VA. CODE § 11A-3-37 (1995). Prior to the amendment and reenactment of the
delinquent and nonentered land statutes in 1994 and 1995, the same obligations were imposed under former Section 1IA-4-2, which was repealed in 1994.
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both experienced title attorneys in Monongalia County. It is our intent
that our two articles be read pari materia.
X.

CONCLUSION

Since the purpose of a title examination is to discover those "defects" which affect the quality or quantity of the present owners' interest, the scope of the title search is dictated by what knowledge or
information the "law" imputes to those interested in the property or
what interests or rights the "law" deems as superior to the interest
acquired by a purchaser of the property. Except for the few noted
issues where neither the court nor the legislature has clearly addressed
what is considered within the "chain of title," the current law in West
Virginia provides reasonably clear answers and guidance. Therefore, it
is probable that to the extent there is any discussion of issue raised
herein, the discussion will focus on whether a matter is "practical" and
not whether it is "necessary." Hopefully, the above dissertation will
assist those concerned with title work to make an informed decision on
how to use the available time in the best interest of his or her clients.
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